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 i 
Abstract 
 
 Water seepage in multi-story buildings is stated as a longstanding and complex 
problem for residents in Hong Kong. The public awareness to water seepage in 
buildings has greatly increased since the outbreak of severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) in 2003. In order to maintain a healthy and safety environment in a 
building, owners have the duty to solve the seepage problems. On the other hand, the 
Government also has the responsibilities to intervene the seepage problems if the 
seepage causes public health nuisance, building safety risks or wastage of water. In 
2006, Joint Office (JO) was jointly set up by Buildings Department and Food and 
Environmental Hygiene Department to abate the public health nuisance by providing 
a one-stop service for handling seepage complaints. In the three stages of 
investigation procedure of seepage complaints, the work in Stage III is outsourced to 
the consultants for professional investigation. The investigation report of Ombudsman 
in 2008 revealed that JO was ineffective in managing and monitoring the consultants 
and low quality of service by the consultants was then resulted. 
 This study aims at finding the impact of outsourcing to the operation of JO. 
Performance measurements, outsourcing outcomes and outsourcing relationships are 
the three main aspects for the study. Questionnaire surveys and interviews are 
conducted to collect opinions from JO and the consultants about those three aspects. 
After analyzing the data, it is found that no serious impact was observed in the 
operation. Instead, this study gives the insight that the communication and 
relationship problems with complainants and undercomplainants are the major 
obstacle in handling water seepage complaints efficiently to provide a high quality 
service. Some improvement measures are recommended for further operation of JO.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
1.1 Background of the study 
 In Hong Kong, water seepage is a very common building defect found in 
multi-story buildings. It is seen as a longstanding and complex problem for residents 
and the Hong Kong Government. The reasons for water seepage occurring in 
buildings can be due to construction workmanship, aging problem and building 
management. The issue that makes all of us to concern is that water seepage in 
buildings can cause a threat to hygiene and a deterioration of building safety. After the 
unforgettable experience in 2003, the community outbreak of severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) in Hong Kong largely drew the public concern to building hygiene 
and safety. The experts found that the outbreak of SARS in Block E of Amoy Gardens 
was due to the vertical spread of the communicable disease over the defected 
sewerage and drainage systems of the buildings (Wong and Hui, 2005). 
Simultaneously, defected sewerage and drainage systems are the main sources of 
water seepage in multi-story buildings. Other main sources of seepage are floor 
infiltration of bathroom, supply pipe leakage for fresh water or flushing water supply 
and rain water leakage from building envelope.  
Unlike the unauthorized buildings works in Hong Kong, there have not been any 
formally published record of water seepage occurred in buildings. However, the 
community outbreak of SARS in Hong Kong affected 1,755 individuals which 
include 300 deaths. These numbers, rather than any formal record, have already drawn 
the public awareness on the issue of building health and safety. The consequence of 
defected sewerage and drainage systems seems unpredictable before the year 2003. 
Nevertheless, no one wants the “disaster” to happen again. 
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For all property owners or occupies, they must want to eliminate this building 
defects out of their properties. Government also has increased the concern about water 
seepage as well as the public health nuisance in multi-story buildings. In order to 
promote the water seepage knowledge to the public, Buildings Department (BD) and 
Food and Environmental Hygiene Department (FEHD) have jointly published the 
“Do-it-yourself Water Seepage Test” pamphlet providing some investigation methods 
of water seepage in buildings. Originally, it should be the duty of property owners to 
deal with water seepage in buildings. They can also call the Government for help if 
they cannot solve the problem by themselves. In the past, those two departments, BD 
and FEHD, as well as the Water Supplies Department and Housing Department would 
handle water seepage complaints from the public. However, the performance in 
handling the matter was unsatisfactory (Wong and Hui, 2005). In recent years, BD 
and FEHD set up the Joint Office (JO) in order to improve the operation. Despite of 
the improvement, the investigation report of Ombudsman (2008) addressed the 
deficiencies observed in the operation of JO. Such deficiencies were subject to the 
investigation of seepage complaints, enforcement action to the liable party, 
management of JO and management of consultant contracts. In particular to the 
management of consultant contracts, Ombudsman blamed that JO was ineffective in 
managing and monitoring consultants and the duration of consultant contracts was too 
short. 
In addition to the deficiencies, the study of Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2001) 
reveals that outsourcing public services is actually causing negative impacts to the 
service or the organization itself. Such impacts would be less operational flexibility, 
lower operational effectiveness, poor use of in-house staff, more adversarial 
relationship, etc.  
With matching the deficiencies found in JO’s outsourcing management and the 
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inspiration from the scholar, this study is going to test if the negative impact exists in 
the public service provided by JO. 
1.2 Aims and Objectives 
This study is conducted with the aim of finding out the underlying impacts of 
outsourcing management in the service of handling of water seepage complaints 
provided by JO. It is believed that improvement to the service can only be proposed 
once the roots of deficiencies and negative impacts are identified. Therefore, the 
objectives of this study are: 
(i) To study the definition, motivation, benefits, risks of outsourcing. 
(ii) To study the management and impact in public service outsourcing. 
(iii) To address the government intervention of water seepage problems in 
Hong Kong. 
(iv) To examine the roles and responsibilities of JO and the consultants in 
outsourcing arrangement of handling of water seepage complaints. 
(v) To investigate the impacts of outsourcing to the water seepage 
investigation service provided by JO. 
(vi) To make recommendations for further outsourcing arrangement to JO. 
 
1.3 Hypothesis 
 Outsourcing has been widely used by public organizations to enhance 
cost-effectiveness and quality of service. Some cases in the direct investigation report 
of Ombudsman shows that quality of service provided by consultants was 
unsatisfactory. In light of this, it is highly possible that negative impacts exist in the 
outsourcing arrangement of JO. So, the hypothesis of this study is: 
- Current outsourcing arrangement of handling of water seepage complaints 
leads to negative impacts to the operation. 
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1.4 Methodology 
 To test the hypothesis, three kinds of research methods are used to conduct the 
study. They are literature review, questionnaire surveys and interviews. Information 
and data obtained by these three methods can supplement each other to give a more 
holistic view over the outsourcing of handling of water seepage complaints by JO.  
 
1.4.1 Literature review 
 There is no room for argument without the base of theory. Literature review can 
provide a better understanding to what is developing in the knowledge of outsourcing. 
The theory of outsourcing, outsourcing in public services, as well as the background 
of JO and all relevant information are collected from books, journals, press releases 
and the Internet. To have deeper understanding to the operation of JO, the full report 
of the direct investigation of Ombudsman is obtained for the study. With these bases 
of study, questionnaire and questions of interview can be set accordingly to test the 
hypothesis.  
 
1.4.2 Questionnaires 
 After reviewing literature on outsourcing from different scholars and having 
deeper understanding of the operation of JO, several possible negative impacts might 
be identified in certain areas of the service. Then, statements of the possible impacts 
in those areas are derived. To determine whether those impacts exist in the 
outsourcing arrangement, two questionnaires are designed to collect opinions of the 
Building Safety Officers of JO and all relevant staff of the consultants.  
 In JO, it is subdivided into JO 1 and JO 2. Outsourcing is only involved in Stage 
III of the investigation work of seepage complaints handled by BD staff of JO. Both 
JO 1 and JO 2 have one Head of Professional Officer and 5 Professional Officers (PO), 
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and each office has 24 Building Safety Officer (BSO) monitored under POs. So, there 
is a total of 2 Head of Professional Officers, 10 POs and 48 BSOs in JO(BD). In the 
organization structure, BSOs are in highest daily contact with the staff of consultants 
in handling water seepage complaints. It is believed that they have good knowledge 
and valuable experience of the outsourcing arrangement. Therefore, they are invited to 
complete the questionnaire and express their opinions on the subject.  
 Higher number of responses can of course reflect a more representative result. In 
my own expectation, the sample size is set to be one third of the population meaning 
16 responses. The estimated response rate is about 30%. In the century of information 
technology, it is more efficient and economical to distribute this questionnaire via 
email. One PO is invited to send the questionnaire to all BSOs.  
 The consultants awarded the contracts in 2009 is another target for the 
questionnaire survey. There are a total of 9 consultants involved in the handling of 
water seepage complaints. These consultants provide on-site investigation which is 
the frontline work of the operations. They should also have good knowledge and 
valuable experience in the outsourcing arrangement. So all levels of staff involved in 
handling of water seepage complaints are invited to complete the questionnaire to 
give their valuable opinions about the issue. Those staff may include contract 
managers, technical staff and investigation assistants of the consultants. As the 
number of staff involved in each consultant is unknown, 12 staff is assumed in each 
consultant1. So there is a total of 108 staff. The sample size is set to be one third of the 
population. It means 36 responses are required. The estimated response rate is 27% to 
33%. Questionnaires are distributed by email through the assistance of PO of JO. 
Concerning not every staff of consultants has personal computers, it is available for 
                                                 
1
 The number of staff in each consultant was justified by the interviewees of consultants in the study.  
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consultants to fill in the questionnaire in hard copy and call me to collect it in person.  
 Before the distribution of the two questionnaire surveys, consent from JO has 
been got for conducting the research. Afterwards, the questionnaire and my research 
proposal together with covering letters are sent to a Head PO of JO by email. The 
cover letters explaining the background of the study, scope of the study, method of 
conducting questionnaire stress the usefulness of the survey and promise 
confidentiality. Two weeks time is allowed for the respondents to send back the 
questionnaire. After the study is finished, thank-you letters are sent to all participants. 
Copies of the questionnaire results are sent to interested participants on request.  
 Questionnaire in this research is beneficial to gain sufficient data for analysis 
from the two parties involved in handling water seepage complaints. The result of the 
questionnaire survey can represent some view in the population. However, this cannot 
provide an in-depth study of the issue. Questions provided in the questionnaire can 
only be simple and easy as open-ended questions would not initiate respondents’ 
interest to participate in the survey. Therefore, in order to fill in the gap of 
questionnaire surveys, interviews are also adopted in this study to understand more 
about the issue and collect information in detail.  
 
1.4.3 Interviews 
 The purpose of interviews is to give a deeper understanding over the issue. 
Unlike the questionnaire, greater interaction is possible between the interviewer and 
the respondents during interview. So, follow-up questions can be raised immediately 
on particular areas of the study. In addition, relevant documents or useful examples 
can be obtained for reference. In this study, emails are sent to invite a Head of PO, a 
PO and 2 consultant representatives to share their invaluable experience about 
handling of water seepage complaints in Hong Kong. The questions for the interviews 
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are mainly based on the context of the 2 questionnaires. Interviewees are asked to 
give examples and explanations of their answers during interviews. After the study is 
finished, thank-you letters are also sent to these contributors.  
 After the data collection from the questionnaire surveys and interviews, all data 
and information are analyzed and discussed afterwards. Therefore, the hypothesis can 
be test. Improvement measures and recommendation can also be given accordingly 
towards the outsourcing arrangement of JO. 
 
1.5 Introduction to chapters 
 Here gives the introduction to chapters of this study.  
 In chapter 1 – Introduction, the background of this study, aims, objectives, 
hypothesis and research methods of this study are introduced. Readers can understand 
what is going to be investigated and how the study is undertaken.  
 In chapter 2 – Literature Review on Outsourcing, views and opinion of scholars 
over outsourcing is discussed. They include the definition, motivation, benefits and 
risks of outsourcing. Management and impacts of outsourcing in public service would 
also be introduced and discussed.  
 In chapter 3 - Handling of Water Seepage Complaints in Hong Kong, the public 
concern about the water seepage in multi-story buildings in Hong Kong is introduced. 
Afterwards, the Government intervention of the water seepage problems and the 
control and enforcement by Joint Office in handling water seepage complaints is also 
introduced.  
 In chapter 4 - Outsourcing Handling of Water Seepage Complaints in Hong 
Kong, the roles and responsibilities of officers of the Joint Office and the private 
consultants in the operation of handling seepage complaints are discussed in detail. 
 In chapter 5 - Impact of Outsourcing noted by the Joint Office, results from the 
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questionnaire surveys and information collected from interviews are presented and 
discussed over the issue in the point of view of the Joint Office. 
 In chapter 6 - Impact of Outsourcing noted by the Consultants, results from the 
questionnaire surveys and information collected from interviews are also presented 
and discussed over the issue in the point of view of the consultants. 
 In chapter 7 – Conclusion, all findings of this study are summarized and then a 
conclusion is drawn accordingly. Most importantly, improvement measures and 
recommendation to the outsourcing arrangement of handling of water seepage 
complaints are suggested. In addition, limitations of this study and areas for further 
research are addressed in the final part of this chapter.  
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review on Outsourcing 
 
Outsourcing is a common practice among both private and public organizations. 
Factories outsource part of their rout line production to others. Property owners 
outsource the security and management of the building to property management firm. 
Even public services organizations would outsource part of their function or services 
to private sectors. Information technology is one of the common elements being 
outsourced by public sectors. Knowing outsourcing is commonly adopted by both 
private and public organizations, it must give benefits to the organizations for 
improving the products or services in terms of quantity or quality. However, literature 
has also pointed out the potential risk or even impacts of outsourcing towards the 
organization. Before looking into the pros and cons of outsourcing, outsourcing 
should be defined first for further illustration.  
  
2.1 Definition of outsourcing 
 In the literature, definition of outsourcing has been given by numerous scholars. 
The following shows how the term “outsourcing” is defined in different literatures.  
According to Quinn (1992) and Sharpe (1997), outsourcing is a form of 
predetermined external provision with another enterprise for the delivery of goods and 
services that could previously have been offered in-house.  
Rajabzadeh, Rostamy and Hosseini (2008) defines outsourcing as the 
procurement of products or services from sources that are external to the organization.  
In another literature, it defines that outsourcing denotes the shift that occurs 
when a business entity takes work traditional performed internally and contracts with 
an external provider for the provision of that work (Economist Inerlligence 
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Unit/Atthur Andersen[EIU/AA, 1995)  
Gay and Essinger (2000) see outsourcing as a process of transferring service 
delivery management responsibility to a third party for providing services that are 
governed by service-level agreements.  
Lei and Hitt (1995) define outsourcing as “reliance on external sources for 
manufacturing components and other value-adding activities”.  
Perry (1997) focuses on employment, defining outsourcing as: “another firm’s 
employees carrying out tasks previously performed by one’s own employees”.  
Sharpe (1997) defines outsourcing as turning over to a supplier those activities 
outside the organization’s chosen core competencies.  
 Among all those definitions, scholars may have different purposes or objectives 
when defining outsourcing. It is likely that those definitions are talking about the 
same things but have different descriptions. Harland, Knight, Lamming, and Walker, 
H. (2005) provide clarification for the definitional confusion which is supported by 
Gilley and Rasheed (2000). They positioning outsourcing as procuring something that 
was either originally sourced internally or could have been sourced internally 
notwithstanding the decision to go outside. This definition will be used for the term 
outsourcing in this research. 
 
2.2 Motivation of outsourcing 
Outsourcing is not only an operation difference to the organization, but also a 
decision driven by some advantages to the organization. In general, there are three 
major categories of motivations for outsourcing which are cost, strategy and politics. 
Cost and strategy are the common driver to outsourcing by private sector, while 
political agendas often drive public sector to consider outsourcing (Kremic, Tukel and 
Rom, 2006). 
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2.2.1 Cost-driven outsourcing 
Outsourcing is identified as saving costs of the organization in much of the 
literature. In theory, outsourcing for cost reasons can occur when suppliers’ costs are 
low enough that even with added overhead, profit, and transaction costs suppliers can 
still deliver a service for a lower price (Bers, 1992). So rather than performing the 
function in-house, specialization and economies of scale in the market are 
mechanisms used to achieve cost saving for the organization (Kakabadse and 
Kakabadse, 2000b).  
However, cost saving is not always achieved. There is increasing evidence that 
cost savings have been overestimated and costs are sometimes higher after 
outsourcing. (Bryce and Useem, 1998; Cole-Gomolski, 1999) 
Other than increase in cost, some additional indirect and social cost may be 
incurred by outsourcing (Cole-Gomolski, 1999; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2000b). 
The indirect cost may include contract monitoring and oversight, contract generation 
and procurement, intangibles, and transition cost. The social cost incurred may be 
difficult to quantify but they can be significant to result in lower morale, lower 
productivity or lower quality of services.  
 
2.2.2 Strategy-driven outsourcing 
More recently, organizations not only consider cost reduction when adopting 
outsourcing, but also treat outsourcing as strategic issues such as core competence and 
flexibility of the firms (DiRomualdo and Gurbaxani, 1998) In general, literature 
supports that outsourcing may offer improvement to business performance or services 
performance on numerous dimensions (Brandes et al., 1997; Dekkers, 2000; McIvor, 
2000). Allowing better focus on the organization’s core competences is one of the 
main dimensions. Due to competition in the market, organizations tend to concentrate 
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and allocate resources to its core functions which give the greatest positive impact to 
the business. McIvor (2000) use Canon as an example to explain core competence. 
Canon’s core competencies in optics, imaging and microprocessor controls have 
allowed it to be a significant player in markets as diverse as photocopiers, laser 
printers, cameras and image scanners. This shows that core competences are the skills, 
knowledge and technologies that an organization possesses on which its success 
depends. 
Another main dimension for considering strategic outsourcing would be the 
flexibility to manage the demand swings (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2000b). The 
need for flexibility of the firms may be due to restructuring, rapid organizational 
growth or changing technology of the business. Therefore, outsourcing can lead the 
organization to be more flexible to the development scale of the firm and quicker 
reactions to customer requirements. This strategic decision also puts forward to 
reduce organization’s risk by sharing it with suppliers and at the same time acquire the 
positive attributes of those suppliers (Kremic et al., 2006). While the organization is 
only an average performer by itself, incorporating the better performance from the 
suppliers results in higher quality of products or service as well as high reputation of 
the organization.  
However, outsourcing for strategic reasons may lead to potential pitfalls to the 
organization. The outsourcing arrangement of IBW always appears in the literature 
being a frequent example of “wrong” outsourcing. It is critical that IBM outsourced 
the operating system to suppliers. Literature points out that if organizations outsource 
the wrong functions they may develop gaps in their learning or knowledge base which 
may preclude them from future opportunities (Earl, 1996; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). 
So, when considering outsourcing, the test for the organizations core competences and 
the suitable functions to be outsourced becomes critical. In industries with complex 
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technologies and systems, outsourced some functions may lead to less productivity or 
efficiency among the remaining functions (Quinn and Hilmer, 1994).  
 
2.2.3 Politically-driven outsourcing 
It is apparent that public organizations behave differently than private firms and 
have different outsourcing motivators in their decision making. In general, 
accountability and performance of public services, rather than market demand or 
profitability, are more concerned by the public organizations. For example, general 
public and the government would concern more the level of health services provided 
by the government whether than the money generated by the services. While the 
private firms are money minded in performing a service, the public organizations 
attempts to ensure general well beings and the social perspective of the community 
(Kremic et al., 2006). Same as outsourcing, public organizations will desire for the 
general well being of citizens on top of cost and strategic reasons. 
Because public organizations are sometimes perceived as inefficient and 
bureaucratic, outsourcing may be promoted to improve the situation in a political 
sense. Under this, the outsourcing drivers for public organizations can be the 
government laws and executive orders (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2000b). 
As mentioned before, accountability is another reason for public organizations to 
promote outsourcing. Deakin and Walsh (1996) find that managers in public 
organizations generally realize an accountability improvement in the particular 
function being outsourced. However, it is not always the case. There is also a 
simultaneous decline in accountability to the public. The reasons behind is simple that 
the suppliers or service providers work to satisfy the government but would not keep 
the public interest primary.  
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2.3 Benefits of outsourcing 
 In the growth and adoption of outsourcing, both public and private organizations 
expect benefits from outsourcing. Kremic et al. (2006) summarized the expected 
benefits of outsourcing from the literature: 
- cost savings 
- reduced capital expenditures 
- capital infusion 
- transfer fixed costs to variable 
- quality improvement 
- increased speed 
- greater flexibility 
- access to latest technology/ infrastructure 
- access to skills and talent 
- augment staff 
- increase focus on core functions 
- get rid of problem functions 
- reduce politic pressures or scrutiny 
- legal compliance 
- better accountability/ management 
 
In general, the desirable benefits of outsourcing for public and private 
organizations are better focus on core competency, financial benefit, increase of 
flexibility and quality improvement. Outsourcing allows a firm to focus its activities 
on its core competency (Petrie, 2000). So the outsourcing firm focuses on broader 
business issues, or maintains a clearer strategic focus, while an outside expert assumes 
operational details. Petrie (2000) also states that outsourcing can deliver considerable 
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savings on several issues such as office space, general overhead, company cars, 
pensions, insurance and salaries. This shows that outsourcing can be financially 
beneficial to organization. Besides, in the real world, business conditions, demand for 
products, services as well as technologies meet changes all the time. Outsourcing 
gives a solution for the firms to improve flexibility by creating smaller and more 
flexible workforces (Greaver, 1999; Patterson and Pinch, 1995). The last important 
benefit is quality improvement. Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2001) reveals that a 1996 
study by the Australian Industry Commission identified improvement in quality of 
service delivery through outsourcing of particular non-core activities and from the 
monitoring of service providers. 
 
2.4 Potential risks of outsourcing 
 Uncertainty often appears in business, failure of outsourcing is always stated in 
the literature to warn us not to just think about the positive sides of outsourcing. The 
case of IBM which have mentioned before is one of the reminder. Kremic et al. (2006) 
also summarized the potential risk of outsourcing from the literature: 
- unrealized savings or hidden costs 
- less flexibility 
- poor contract or poor selection of partner 
- loss of knowledge/ skills and the difficulty in reacquiring a function 
- loss of control/ core competence 
- power shift to supplier/ service provider 
- supplier problems (poor performance or bad relations, opportunistic 
behaviour, not giving access to best talent or technology) 
- losing customers, opportunistic behaviour or reputation 
- uncertainty/ changing environment 
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- poor morale/ employee issues 
- loss of synergy 
- create competitor 
- conflict of interest 
- security issues 
- false sense of irresponsibility 
- legal obstacles 
- skill erosion 
 
McIvor (2000) points out the evidence to suggest that organizations are not 
achieving the desired benefits from outsourcing. For example, a survey carried out by 
PA Consulting Group (1996) found that only 5 per cent of companies surveyed had 
achieved high levels of benefits from outsourcing. McIvor (2000) addresses the key 
problems leading to outsourcing failure. First, many organizations decide outsourcing 
for short-term reasons of cost reduction and capacity. Without the input of long-term 
strategic implications and the workforce reaction to outsourcing, outsourcing cannot 
effectively give a positive impact to the organization (Petrie, 2000; Antonucci et al., 
1998). Second, many organization have no formal outsourcing process, dependent on 
suppliers increases as a result. Third, core business definition is not easy for each 
organization, outsourcing a wrong function can affect the competitive advantage of 
the organization. Over-outsourcing is also a risk that draws high concern in the 
literature (Patterson and Pinch, 1995). It can easily lead to decrease in quality of 
services. Such implication is termed as “hollowing out” for private sectors and 
“hollow state” for government (Harland et al., 2005). This is concluded as a cause by 
insufficient attention paid on the overall management of the outsourced functions.  
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2.5 Outsourcing Decision 
Before adopting the outsourcing arrangement, the decision to outsource a 
function should be considered under certain factors. Strategy, cost functions 
characteristics and environment are the four categories of factors which may impact 
outsourcing decisions (Kremic et al., 2006).  
 In the category of strategy, core competence, human resources, quality of service 
and flexibility are the main factors to be considered. Core competence is what an 
organization uses to sustain a competitive advantage in the market. Organizations 
draw much attention to it as the core function is the activities that the firm performs 
better than any other enterprise (Quinn, 1999). Therefore, literature suggests a 
function that is more core to the organization is less likely to be outsourced. 
(Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2000b; McIvor, 2000) 
Lack of internal human resources is also a strategic factor that leads to 
outsourcing. Public organizations may be particularly impacted by this factor. As 
there may be strict guidelines on the number of civil servants that can be employed 
and employees continue to leave the public organization due to retiring and exiting. 
This results in increase in workload and decrease in knowledge and skills for those 
remaining. Under the situation, it is like that public organization will acquire the need 
skills from outside sources. (Green, 2000) 
For public and private organizations, quality of services is always an issue to be 
considered and controlled. It is because the quality of an organization’s services 
establishes reputation and can create demand. Such consideration should be more 
concerned by the public organization as they emphasis on the accountability of the 
services. So, outsourcing should primary be a seeking of better quality of services 
from the supplier than providing in house. Potential improvement of the work can be 
achieved by acquiring better performer of the services. (Anderson, 1997) 
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 The last factor in the strategy category is flexibility. This includes demand 
flexibility, operational flexibility, resource flexibility, or the flexibility of a number of 
other strategic elements. According to the literature, organizations sometimes 
consider outsourcing in an effort to increase flexibility. It may be true for large 
bureaucratic organizations such as government may improve on their flexibility by 
outsourcing. However, loss of flexibility may be resulted when long contracts 
outsourced into a limited market (Antonucci et al., 1998). 
 The next factor category is cost. It is likely that organization outsources a 
function as the current in-house costs are higher than the expected costs for 
purchasing the service (Welch and Nayak, 1992). However, cost savings to the 
organization may not be as high as the expected one as hidden cost appeared during 
outsourcing. Literature suggests that the comparison between the cost of make or buy 
can be difficult. 
 Function characteristics are the next factor category. These include complexity, 
degree of integration, asset specificity and structure of the function. Complexity refers 
to the difficulty of recognizing or understanding the variables and the interactions that 
surround a function. When the outsourced function is more complex, it is more 
difficult for a supplier to articulate the requirements. So the supplier is unlikely to 
perform such function as it is time consuming and cost ineffective. 
 Degree of integration of function influences the outsourcing decision as well. 
Integration refers to the degree the function is linked into other functions and systems 
within the organization. It is difficult to maintain high level of interactions and 
communication in heavily integrated function. This situation would be even worse 
when the function is outsourced. Therefore, such integrated function is not suggested 
to be outsourced (Prencipe, 1997). 
 The next function characteristic is asset specificity. This describes the case where 
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durable equipment or products are generated by the outsourcing arrangement and they 
have little value outside of that function. Outsourcing of function with high asset 
specificity is not attractive to the suppliers as they have little incentive to maintain or 
upgrade the durable items. In general, the greater the asset specificity the less likely 
outsources the function. 
 The last function characteristic is the structure of the function going to be 
outsourced. Structure relates to the degree the function follows a predictable pattern. 
Supplier can get familiar with the function faster if it is well structured. So, a more 
structured function is a better to be outsourced 
The final category of factors relate to the internal and external environment faced 
by the organization. For the internal environment, preference of manager and internal 
political environment of the firm can influence the decision of outsourcing as these 
two factors give a direct impact to the operation of the outsourced function. 
In considering externally, requirement of highly specialized skills, more legal 
hurdles, greater uncertainly of the work, potential conflict of interest of the supplier 
would likely to be obstacles for outsourcing. The only promoting factor in the external 
environment is the action of competitors. Willcocks and Currie (1997) reveals that 
many firms try outsourcing is because others are doing it. In general, a function is 
more likely to be outsourced if the organization’s competitors are actively outsourcing 
it. 
In particular to public organization, political pressures have undeniable influence 
to outsourcing of public functions. Unlike the private organizations, other than cost 
and profit, public organizations make the outsourcing decision based on the social 
concerns or current national or international trends. The influence can put forward 
outsourcing a function or pull back a function in-house.  
  
 20
2.6 Management in Public Service Outsourcing 
 In general, outsourcing management stands on the same basis for private or 
public organizations. As public service outsourcing is considered in this research, this 
section will discuss the management issues for public services in particular.  
According to the Efficiency Unit (2008), several management issues are 
addressed as the support processes for the outsourcing project in government 
departments. These key issues include project management, change management, 
quality management, risk management, issues management, financial management 
and record management.  
 
2.6.1 Project management 
Departments should ensure that there are sufficient resources to support the 
whole process in outsourcing. Appointing a specific project team to handle the 
outsourcing process is a common way to achieve the issue. The team should have the 
core skills including the areas of sourcing of market knowledge, project management, 
technical and operational, problem-solving, change management, financial analysis 
and modeling as well as legal.  
 
2.6.2 Change management 
In the outsourcing of public service, many operational changes are involved in 
staff, organization structure, processes, skills and competencies, information 
technology systems, etc. It can lead to success of outsourcing if the department is able 
to implement and manage the operational changes. The relevant skills require to 
achieve such implementation are careful planning, teamwork, commitment, and 
involvement of stakeholders.  
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2.6.3 Quality management 
Quality management is important to the life cycle of an outsourcing project as it 
is a continuous process from the start to the end of outsourcing. Quality is achieved 
when all deliverables are produced according to specifications and standards, meeting 
users’ needs and expectations and in a manner that is perceived by the departments as 
successful.  
 
2.6.4 Risk Management 
Risk management is a continuous process to minimize the impact of unplanned 
incidents on the project or the department by first identifying and addressing potential 
risks and second reducing and mitigating the risks to an acceptable level. This can 
prevent negative consequences or impact occurs during the outsourcing process. 
Contingency plan may be essential for departments where there is a high level of 
outsourcing activities. Walker and Rowlinson (2008) support giving attention to risk 
management in outsourcing. They urge that a series of additional risk should be taken 
into account when considering the outsourcing of services. For example, successful 
outsourcing requires the organization to ensure that not only the deliverables meet the 
specifications, but also the relationships and contractual requirements are to be 
measured and maintained (Cooke-Davies, 2002). 
 
2.6.5 Issues management 
The primary objective of this is to establish a standard method to document and 
analyze the issues encountered, and formulate solutions. Such implementation can 
reduce outsourcing risks when issues are managed under structured and 
comprehensive procedures. 
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2.6.6 Financial management 
Cost is always an issue in outsourcing. Departments should ensure that the 
outsourcing projects are in line with their own financial management strategy and 
practices. Apparently, financial management should be a continuous and regular 
process in order to achieve the financial objectives. 
 
2.6.7 Record management 
It is an integral part of outsourcing project to have a comprehensive record 
management. All records that created and received during the outsourcing project 
should be captured in the department’s record keeping system. This systematic 
approach can provide evidence of business conducted and decisions made, manage 
legal and other risks, meet its accountability obligations, facilitate future reference 
and queries, and capture and share lessons learnt.  
 
Other than the general guide to outsourcing, Efficiency Unit also published a 
user guide to contract management (Efficiency Unit, 2007) aims to provide accurate, 
practical and relevant guidance to civil servant contact managers or frontline 
supervisors on how to address commonly encountered challenges in contract 
preparation, management and monitoring for outsourcing projects.  
In outsourcing of government services, usually, service provider or supplier is 
acting for or operating on behalf of the government in its dealing with third parties 
who are mot likely the public. While the public looks for the government to deliver 
the service, the actual party to delivery the service is services provider. Therefore, 
great care needs to be exercised in negotiating and monitoring the service provider.  
In order to maintain the service quality to the public, the guideline emphasizes on 
the performance management and relationship management during the term of the 
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outsourcing contract.  
 
2.6.8 Performance management 
Keeping the quality of service in outsourcing is a very important aspect in the 
contract management. Department will face the challenges of defining performance 
measures and monitoring the providers’ performance during contract execution.  
The guideline addresses some common poor practices in relation to performance 
management during contract preparation and execution (Efficiency Unit, 2007):  
- Having too many irrelevant performance measures and reports, resulting in 
unnecessarily high administrative effort for both contractors and departments 
and a significantly long lead time in confirming service delivery and 
authorizing payment; 
- Defining impractical measures, requiring unreasonably huge effort to measure 
and report performance, which can be expensive and complex in execution; 
- Insufficient communication and exchange of views at the senior management 
level from both parties;  
- Adopting adversarial monitoring approaches; 
- Micromanagement of contractors resulting in unnecessary interference and 
government taking back risks that the contractor is being paid to bear. 
 
In view of those poor practices, the guidelines suggest the department to define a 
reasonable and achievable service level agreement (SLA) and establish effective 
performance monitoring mechanisms. In the SLA, it aims to provide a clear basis for 
determining the acceptable level of the contractors’ performance and hence payment 
approval. So, the performance measures defined in SLA should be practical, 
manageable and measuring service output rather than input. In addition, the 
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performance measures should support the objectives of the outsourcing projects, 
address key service requirements and be aligned with the performance pledge that 
departments have committed to their customers. 
Setting up performance measures to contractors is only one of the methods in 
collecting performance data. Combination of several methods can construct a 
comprehensive performance monitoring mechanism to further ensure an objective 
assessment of providers’ performance. Figure 1 below is a suggested mechanism 
giving in the guideline. 
 
Figure 2.1 Performance Monitoring Mechanisms (Source: Efficiency Unit, 2007) 
 
2.6.9 Relationship management 
Establishing trust and commitment between contractual parties is highly 
concerned in outsourcing project. It is a key to successful outsourcing when 
department and the service providers act ethically and collaborate closely with each 
other. So, the guideline suggests departments to adopt a partnership mentality when 
managing provider relationship. To achieve partnering in outsourcing relationship, 
departments need to focus on: 
- shared objectives 
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- best value for money 
- a long-term relationship 
- mutual trust/ cooperation 
- measuring output performance 
- mutually agreed requirements 
- early integrated planning 
- open joint communication 
 
To maintain a good relationship between departments and contractors, the 
guideline addresses the following characteristics of having a multi-tier governance 
structure: 
- Stakeholders are engaged at all levels from relevant parties with clear roles, 
responsibilities and counterparts identified 
- A single contact point from both parties is available to ensure unity of 
responsibilities and consistency of information exchange 
- Headquarters and district/local operations are suitably involved 
 
Departments should also have associated management processes in place with 
the governance structure. The issues of the processes can be: 
- Holding regular meetings with the steering group and senior management to 
steer strategic directions and address major issues 
- Meeting regularly with service review groups or user groups to solicit 
feedback and understand the evolving operating environments 
- Managing issues and risks 
- Performing major contract reviews 
- Invoking feedback and continuous improvement mechanisms 
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In addition to governance structure and management issue, building a culture of 
mutual trust and commitment is important. Cooperative and mutual understanding 
between both parties by open and frequent dialogue can contribute to each other’s 
success. However, it is not easy to achieve in practice.  
As building the relationship is essential and beneficial to both parties, the 
guideline suggests the following key elements in the relationship management: 
- A shared vision and expectations 
- Aligned interests and goals 
- Consistency of actions 
- Predictability of responses 
- Mutual respect and understanding 
- Proactive and intensive communications 
- Encouragement and participation 
- Sharing of risks and rewards 
 
The guideline also addresses the following practical actions which may help 
establishing trusting relationships and collaborative culture: 
- Notifying successful contractors well in advance 
- Conducting kick-off meetings with contractors to facilitate the engagement 
process from the start of the transition planning stage and to get them familiar 
upfront with the way departments operate 
- Conducting regular service delivery and contract meetings for ongoing review, 
providing feedback for continuous improvement, promoting open and clear 
communication, enhancing mutual understanding and resolving issues together 
- Involving senior management from both parties periodically to maintain the 
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relationship and ensuring that it stays on track throughout the life of the 
contract 
 
In the outsourcing arrangement, departments should always aim at continuous 
improvement to the outsourcing process. All of the above management processes or 
issues are a way assisting departments to achieve their objective and best practice in 
outsourcing. Of course, the ultimate goal of managing outsourcing of public services 
is to make a “win-win-win” situation for the government, contractors and 
users/customers. 
 
2.7 Impact of Outsourcing in Delivering Public Services 
Outsourcing impact has been addressed in the literature that organizations are not 
gaining benefits from outsourcing and results in having negative impact to the 
organizations (McIvor, 2000, Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2001). In this section, the 
outsourcing implication in particular to public organization will be discussed. 
 Outsourcing of public service is found more cost effective but the public 
organization stand accused of providing diminishing quality of service (Kakabadse 
and Kakabadse, 2000a).  
 Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2001) use the survey of the Cranfield Study to 
illustrate the impact of outsourcing. The study reveals that public service managers 
regard the outsourced processes and activities as non-critical to the current and future 
functioning of the public organization. The study also shows that the senior managers 
in public service organizations confirm the view that service provision has not 
benefited from outsourcing. Those managers state that outsourcing has led to: 
- loss of knowledge and skills in providing for particular services 
- loss of technology and R&D capability 
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- less operational flexibility 
- lower operational effectiveness 
- poor use of in-house staff 
- more demotivated staff 
- greater numbers of staff reductions 
- lost opportunities in terms of recognizing and dealing with 
organizational needs and with community needs 
 
In addition to the above impacts of outsourcing, a diminishing quality of 
relationships between the public services organizations and their service providers is 
showed in that study. In particular, outsourcing is reported as leading to: 
- the emergence of more adversarial relationships between the host organization 
and suppliers 
- a decline in the quality of relationship between the host organization and its 
suppliers 
- an emerging inflexibility in responding to the needs of communities and other 
key stakeholders 
- greater disrespect between the partners 
 
The study concluded that the relationship is becoming more distant between 
public service organizations and their outsource service providers. This is considered 
to have a damaging effect on the ability to meet agreed standards of service.  
Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2001) addresses that public service managers feel 
that accountability to the public has been undermined by the disruption arising from 
what they regard as unnecessary outsourcing of non-critical processes and activities 
which nevertheless still have a significant effect on the functioning of the host 
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organization.  
 
In March, 2008, the Office of the Ombudsman, Hong Kong has done a direct 
investigation report of handling of water seepage complaints in Hong Kong. Since 
mid-2006, the Joint Office (JO) set up by Buildings Department (BD) and Food and 
Environmental Hygiene Department (FEHD) is responsible to handle water seepage 
complaints in Hong Kong. The report aims to investigate the effectiveness of JO in 
handling seepage complaints. The results showed JO is encountering several 
deficiencies in the issue. The deficiency that draws my large concern is the 
management of consultants. JO has outsourced part of the work in handling the water 
seepage complaints to consultants. The report states some cases that the consultants 
are not satisfying the requirement of the work which influence the quality of service. 
The purpose of this research is to investigate the outsourcing management of JO to the 
consultants and find out if there is any outsourcing impacts observed in the work. The 
performance measurements, outsourcing outcomes and outsourcing relationships are 
three key areas to be investigated. This would be a valuable research as it can reveal 
the existing situation of the outsourcing management of JO so as to formulate 
corresponding recommendations to further operation of the work. 
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Chapter 3 - Handling of Water Seepage Complaints in Hong Kong 
 
3.1 Water Seepage in Multi-story Building in Hong Kong 
Water seepage in multi-story building is stated as a longstanding and complex 
problem for residents and the Hong Kong Government (Wong and Hui, 2005). It is 
basically a matter of building management which may cause a threat to hygiene and a 
deterioration of building safety. After 2003, the community outbreak of severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS) in Hong Kong largely drew the public concern to 
building hygiene and safety. Wong and Hui (2005) address the investigation findings 
of the Government on 17 April 2003 referring to the possible sources of the outbreak. 
The vertical spread of SARS in Block E was attributed to a combination of 
dried-up U-traps, contaminated sewerage, and updraft in the lightwell, that 
facilitated droplets spread. 
This indicates that deficiencies in sewerage or drainage systems give potential risks to 
the occupiers of the building. In addition to sewerage and drainage systems, plumbing 
systems, roof, bathroom floor slab and external wall are also common elements where 
deficiencies were found especially for water seepage. Therefore, in case of any 
observed or identified water seepage problems, property owners should give 
immediate reaction and bear the responsibilities to arrange the maintenance works. 
For seepage cases in common areas of a multi-story building such as external wall, 
Owners’ Corporation may act as the management body of the building to arrange 
renovation work of those defect areas. However, Government also has a statutory 
responsibility to intervene if seepage causes public health nuisance, building safety 
risks or water seepage wastage. 
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3.2 Government Responsibility 
In handling water seepage in private property, property owners would first try to 
deal with the problems themselves. Despite maintenance of private property is the 
responsibility of property owners, sometimes it is difficult for owners to obtain 
cooperation between them. They will then turn to Government for assistance. By law, 
Government intervention is necessary if seepage leads to public health nuisance, 
building safety risks or wastage of water. 
  
3.2.1 Public health Nuisance 
 Food and Environmental Hygiene Department (FEHD) deals with public health 
nuisances under the Public Health and Municipal Services Ordinance, Cap. 132 
(PHMSO). Section 127 of PHMSO confers FEHD the power to issue notices 
requiring the abatement of nuisances and section 126 give the department the power 
of entry. 
In section 12 of PHMSO, it specifies the types of nuisance to be abated. These 
include vessels or premises in a state of nuisance; animals or birds kept in such a 
manner as to be a nuisance; and water tanks or containers, waste or rainwater pipes, or 
sanitary convenience in a state of nuisance. However, other than the types of nuisance, 
there is no further definition to the amounts of nuisance. 
 
3.2.2 Building safety risks 
Buildings Department (BD) is the one to intervene when the building problems 
relate to the building safety risks. According to the Building Ordinance, Cap. 123 
(BO), BD has the powers to issue orders to owners requiring the demolition or 
alteration of unauthorized building works(section 24); to make safe dangerous 
building (section 26); requiring investigation into and remedial work for building 
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defects (section 26A); requiring investigation into and remedial works for drainage 
defects (section 28). 
However, these powers are more likely to be used when dealing with 
unauthorized building works. With the intention of the Ordinance to render building 
safety, these powers can only be exercised to tackle serious water seepage cases that 
highly affect building safety. Application of the ordinance towards common seepage 
cases is rare.  
 
3.2.3 Wastage of water 
Wastage of water can draw the Government intervention by Water Supplies 
Department (WSD). When considering wastage of water, both potable water or 
flushing water is involved. WSD is empowered under the Waterworks Ordinance, Cap. 
102 (WO). WSD can issue notices requiring repairs in case of wastage of water under 
section 16 of WO and enter the premises under section 12. 
 
In general, FEHD, BD and WSD deal with seepage complaints separately in 
according to their individual legal supporting ground. However, such arrangement in 
handling seepage complaints was claimed to be unsuccessful (Wong and Hui, 2005). 
The separation of power in handling the same problem in buildings initiated the 
drawbacks such as low success rates, underutilization of Government staff resources, 
ineffective use of tests and equipment, etc. To make improvement, Wong and Hui 
(2005) suggests a centralized task force should be formed to coordinate the three 
government departments so as to implement a one-stop service in handling the 
seepage complaints. In present, such centralized task force have already been set up 
which is now called the Joint Office (JO). 
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3.3 Joint Office (JO) 
Since mid-2006, in order to have better interdepartmental coordination and better 
arrangement in handing seepage complaints, the Joint Office (JO) of BD and FEHD 
was set up aiming for improvement of the operation. The following will look into 
detail of the development of JO, organization of JO and the operation of handling 
seepage complaints. 
 
3.3.1 Development of JO 
Tripartite arrangement 
 As mentioned before, while JO was not yet set up, water seepage complaints 
were handled under the Tripartite Arrangement which consists of FEHD, BD and 
WSD. For any seepage complaints, FEHD acted as the first contact point and would 
usually conduct a Colour Water Test to identify any leaks in drainage pipes of the 
suspected premises. If the test fails to identify the source of seepage, FEHD would 
refer the matters of complaints to BD and WSD for further investigation. 
 When the case comes to BD, investigation officer would check for any building 
safety risks mainly by visual examination. For WSD, Water Meter Flow Check would 
be conducted in order to identify any wastage of potable or flushing water. If 
investigations of BD and WSD were still not successful, Government intervention of 
the seepage matter would cease. 
 However, the performance of this Tripartite Arrangement was poor in handling 
the matter. The direct investigation report done by Office of The Ombudsman (2008) 
revealed that the success rate of identifying the source of seepage in the Tripartite 
Arrangement was only about 14%. Therefore, in the “Report on Measures to Improve 
Environmental Hygiene in Hong Kong” issued in August 2003, the idea of setting up 
JO is proposed as one of the post-SARS initiatives. Of course, the main purpose is to 
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improve current arrangement through better interdepartmental coordination. 
 
JO Scheme 
 In order to have a trial for the new system of operation, a pilot JO was firstly set 
up in Sham Shui Po in December 2004. Only the staff from BD and FEHD is 
involved in the pilot JO. Staff from WSD was not considered as they seldom play the 
role in seepage complaints. According to the report of Ombudsman (2008), JO 
provides a one-stop service for seepage complaints with the following assigned 
function. 
- having the legal authority of FEHD and the building survey expertise of 
BD 
- coordinating enforcement action 
- outsourcing seepage investigation to private survey firms to relieve BD to 
focus on priority tasks 
- publishing a set of comprehensive guidelines to educate the public on the 
roles and responsibilities of the parties involved in seepage cases, 
including flat owners and building managers; and to give technical advice 
to flat owners on the causes of seepage, possible detection and prevention 
measures and common repair methods 
 
Not surprisingly, the pilot JO identified the source of seepage in 68% of the 
investigated complaints during the first three quarters of 2005. This increase success 
rate support Government to further extend the scheme. In mid-2006, the one-stop 
service of JO was extended to cover all 19 districts in the territory. 
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3.3.2 Organization of JO 
It is difficult to organize all the seepage complaints by the pilot JO. So, 
additional JO offices were set up to facilitate the operation. In total, there are 19 
District JO offices and they are grouped under two Regional JO offices.  
 The two Regional JO offices are called as JO 1 and JO 2. Normally, each 
Regional JO office is headed by Professional Officer of BD who may be a Building 
Surveyor or a Structural Engineer. JO 1 has three combined offices with BD and 
FEHD staff located in Eastern, Wan Chai and Kwun Tong. Each districts is looked 
after by at least one BD Professional Officer. Other than these three district, JO is 
responsible for the supervision of nine more District JOs which have separated offices 
in Central & Western, Southern, Wong Tai Sin, Island, Sai Kung, Sha Tin, Tai Po, 
North and Yuen Long. In these districts one BD Professional Officer has to look after 
more than one district.  
For JO 2, the structure of staff is similar. It supervises seven District JOs which 
consist of three combined offices in Sham Shui Po, Kowloon City and Kwai Tsing, 
and four separated offices in Yau Tsim, Tuen Mun, Tsuen Wan, and Kwai Tsing. The 
detail organization chart of JO by region and district is shown in Appendix I. 
 
3.3.3 Handling of Water Seepage Complaints 
Investigation Procedures 
One of the reasons for the unsuccessful implementation of the Tripartite 
Arrangement is due to the poor investigation methods and technology. Aiming for 
improvement, JO has played much effort to introduce additional investigation 
methods and more advance technology. In 2003, BD commissioned a consultancy 
study to carry out thorough research to explore technology and testing methods for the 
investigation of water seepage. A revised set of methods have been introduced and 
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developed since the commencement of the pilot JO scheme in Sham Shui Po. The 
table below shows the methods employed by JO to investigate different suspected 
sources of seepage. The description of the following tests is provided in Appendix II. 
 
Suspected Source of Seepage Method / Test 
Drains and sanitary fitments Colour Water Test 
Floor slab and roof Ponding Test 
External wall Moisture Content Monitoring Test and sometimes 
Infrared Scan 
Water supply pipes Reversible Pressure Test (for both potable and 
flushing water) and Water Meter Flow Check in 
suspected unit (for potable water only) 
Table 3.1 Investigation Method of Different Suspected Sources of Seepage. 
 
The above tests are only the technical solution to the investigation. The 
procedure in handling the seepage investigation is also important. JO investigates 
seepage complaints in three stages. Stage I is a initial screening process by FEHD 
staff of JO. Stages II and III are the further investigation done by FEHD and BD staff 
respectively to identify the source of seepage  
Stage I: Confirmation of Water Seepage Nuisance 
Visual inspection and moisture measurement are included in the screening 
process of Stage I. A moisture meter is used for the moisture measurement of the 
seepage area. Percentage of moisture content would be showed by the moisture meter 
indicating the degree of water seepage. With an moisture content below 35% , the 
complaint is screened out as the seepage area is indicated as dry water mark according 
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to JO’s screening criteria. For complaints with moisture content higher than 35%, they 
will be referred to Stage II for investigation. 
Stage II: Initial Investigation 
At Stage II, FEHD staff in JO will follow the work from Stage 1 and try to 
identify the source of seepage with Colour Water Test; Moisture Content Monitoring 
Test; Water Meter Flow Check and Reversible Pressure Test depending on the 
suspected source. Stage III will be initiated if such tests fail to identify the source. 
Stage III: Professional Investigation 
At Stage III, BD staff in JO or JO(BD)’s consultants mainly conduct Ponding 
Test and Reversible Pressure Test. Sometimes, the tests conducted in Stage II will be 
repeated where warranted because of confirmation testing of the source. Methods like 
Water Meter Flow Check and Infrared Scanner may sometimes be used.  
If the source of seepage can still not be identified after three stages of 
investigation, no enforcement action can be taken by JO. That case will be classify as 
“unsuccessful”. JO will further advice the complainant.  
 
3.3.4 Enforcement Procedures 
Enforcement procedure will follow up once positive result observed in the 
investigation of the seepage complaints. Therefore, where the source of seepage is 
identified and enforcement action under PHMSO , BO or WO is considered 
appropriate, JO will institute proceedings. The proceedings under PHMSO include a 
warning letter issued by JO to the liable party in first place. If there is no positive 
response from the liable party within two weeks and no sign of improvement of the 
seepage area, JO may than issue a nuisance notice. JO will allow two to four weeks 
for abatement depending on the scale of repair required.  
If enforcement action under BO and WO is considered appropriate, the case will 
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be referred to BD and WSD respectively. BD and WSD will then perform the 
proceedings accordingly.  
However, report of Ombudsman (2008) reveals that the three departments do not 
always agree on the appropriate enforcement action for some particular source of 
seepage. Except the enforcement action for drainage defects, different departments 
may have different views on enforcement over other defects such as floor slabs, roof, 
external wall or water supply pipes.   
 For the enforcement against multiple owners when seepage related to the 
communal part of a building, JO will not take enforcement action. Instead, JO will 
only advice the complainant to coordinate with co-owners or incorporated Owners of 
the building to abate the nuisance. The reason behind is that much effort and resources 
are required to ascertain responsibilities for carrying out repair and serving nuisance 
notices on all owners concerned while the complainant himself is one of the owner/ 
occupier receiving the notice.  
 In the cases when the three departments have no legal powers to enforce against 
them, JO can only try to assist the complainant by issuing advisory letters to the 
parties responsible. 
 
3.3.5 Entry into Premises 
In the investigation process of seepage cases, entry into suspected premises is 
always the critical task faced by the staff. If there are unresponsive or uncooperative 
parties refusing to grant access, both FEHD and BD staff in JO are delegated with 
statutory powers of entry into premises under section 126 of PHMSO. Guidelines on 
exercising the powers are given to all staff of JO. JO(BD)’s consultants are not 
delegated with any statutory powers of entry. BD staff in JO should assist the entry if 
consultants face the access problem. In fact, consultants should initially fulfill the 
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following requirement: 
- making at least two attempts at different hours of the day to gain access to 
the suspected premises within two weeks of the date of assignment of the 
Works Order. 
 
3.3.6 Home Ownership Schemes and Tenant Purchase Schemes 
For seepage complaints in Home Ownership Schemes and Tenant Purchase 
Schemes, JO handle them in the same way as those in private buildings. However, 
because BD Headquarters has delegated its powers under BO to an independent unit 
in the Housing Department in respect of these housing schemes, cases identified as 
involving building safety, major drainage defects or unauthorized building works, 
normally referred by JO to BD Headquarters for action, will be referred to the 
Housing Department instead. 
 
3.3.7 Dispute resolution 
If no enforcement action under the three ordinances is considered appropriate, 
seepage cases that cannot be resolved among property owners are civil disputes. Some 
complainants choose to initiate legal proceedings, which can be expensive and time 
consuming. 
In light of public demand for a more efficient and effective dispute settlement 
mechanism for building maintenance and management issues, including water 
seepage, Government has put forward a proposal to establish a Building Affairs 
Tribunal (BAT) in its document on the “Public Consultation on Buildling 
Management and Maintenance” released in January 2005.  
The purpose of BAT is to provide with an alternative channel to settle disputes in 
relation to such matters as water seepage, environmental nuisance, collection and use 
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of management funds, etc. However, some concerns show the negative implication on 
human right and judicial system. Government undertook to continue to study the 
feasibility of the BAT proposal in the report on “Public Consultation on Mandatory 
Building Inspection” released in May 2007. 
 
3.3.8 Public concern to JO 
Although improvement of handling seepage matters is observed after the 
introduction of JO, Ombudsman (2008) stated that complaints about the issue 
continue even after the establishment of JO. Most of those complaints addressed the 
problems in JO’s operation and procedures. The situation indicates a need for 
improvement.  
On 31 March 2008, The Ombudsman published the report of the direct 
investigation into Government’s arrangements for handling water seepage complaints 
aiming to assist the operation of JO. This report covers the following issues: 
- the responsibilities of FEHD, BD, WSD and JO in handling water seepage 
complaints 
- the current procedures and practices of these departments and JO for 
handling such complaints 
- their effectiveness in handling such complaints 
 
Based on the study of The Ombudsman, the following deficiencies of JO were 
identified: 
- difficulty in identifying source of seepage 
- insufficient operational timelines in the investigation procedure 
- difficulty in entering premises suspected to be “source” 
- disagreement over departmental enforcement responsibilities 
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- divergent interpretation of “nuisance” 
- failure to enforce against multiple owners 
- deficiency in JO’s management information for enforcement 
- disjointed organizational structure of JO 
- need for a formal head, as opposed to a nominal lead department 
- frequent turnover of JO staff 
- Ineffective management and monitoring of consultants 
- Short duration of consultant contracts 
 
To my study in outsourcing, the last two deficiencies identified by Ombudsman 
attract most of my attention. In the next part, the outsourcing arrangement in JO and 
the deficiencies discovered by Ombudsman will be discussed in more detail.  
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Chapter 4 - Outsourcing Handling of Water Seepage Complaints 
in Hong Kong 
 
In the investigation procedure, outsourcing is implemented in Stage III. JO(BD), 
BD staff of JO, outsources the investigation work in Stage III to consultants. The main 
duty of consultants is to identify the source of seepage for the the complainants. 
 
4.1 Management of Consultants 
Consultants play an important role in JO’s investigative work. Since June 2005, 
JO(BD) has awarded 19 term contracts of not more than 12 months’ duration to eight 
consultants: one contract in 2005, nine to five consultants in 2006, and a further nine 
to five consultants in 2007. In 2009, JO(BD) has awarded 19 term contracts to nice 
consultants. During the contract period, JO(BD) may issue Works Orders to the 
consultant; Works Orders not yet completed upon contract expiry will continue up to 
the completion of the orders. 
In the contract awarded by JO(BD), there is no provision for renewal. All 
contracts are re-tendered upon expiry. Each consultant may be awarded a maximum 
of two contracts in each tender exercise. According to the report of Ombudsman 
(2008), the contracts contain the following provisions to supervise the consultants: 
- the consultants shall submitted a technical report for each Works Order 
within six weeks or as instructed by JO(BD) 
- the consultants shall submit progress reports every other week 
- the consultants shall attend regular bi-weekly progress report meetings 
chaired by the two Heads of JO 
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In case that the performance of a consultant is unsatisfactory, JO(BD) has in 
place the following mechanism: 
- JO(BD) can issue a warning letter to the consultant drawing attention to 
the identified shortcomings and calling for remedial actions and improved 
performance 
- In case of no improvement, JO(BD) can recommend an adverse report for 
sanction of the consultant under BD’s Consultants’ Performance Reporting 
System. The Consultants Review Committee of BD Headquarters may 
decide to terminate the contract if necessary 
- Under the Consultants’ Performance Reporting System, the BD Consultant 
Review Committee of BD Headquarters to review consultants’ 
performance reports on a quarterly basis. A consultant who is given two 
consecutive adverse reports will be suspended from bidding for new 
contracts. 
 
As reported by Ombudsman, between June 2005 and November 2007, JO(BD) 
has issued 57 warning letters and six adverse reports to its eight consultants employed 
under the 19 contracts. No consultants have been suspended from tendering for future 
contracts or has the contract terminated on account of unsatisfactory performance. 
In light of the unsatisfactory performance of consultants, JO(BD) has been 
exploring ways to strengthen its management of consultants. JO(BD) have been 
revised and tightened the contract terms so as to give the consultants a better 
understanding of what is required of them in respect of administration of tests and 
entry into premises. In addition, JO(BD) also intends to introduce the following 
measures: 
- to set timeline for the major deliverables in future contracts 
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- to require consultants to submit a standardized report for monitoring 
- to require consultants to submit a standardized record of contacts/ visits to 
premises 
- to standardize the format of warning letters to draw consultants attention 
clearly to their unsatisfactory performance 
 
4.2 Problems in Consultant Management 
According to the above management of consultants in JO, Ombudsman (2008) 
identified two main deficiencies of the consultant management. One is the ineffective 
management and monitoring of consultants and the other one is short duration of 
consultant contract. 
 
4.2.1 Ineffective Management and Monitoring of Consultants 
As the office employing the consultants, JO(BD) must manage them effectively. 
However, despite its monitoring effort, the results achieved by some consultants are 
not satisfactory. Ombudsman (2008) has two case studies to illustrate the deficiencies. 
 In one of the cases, despite the contractual requirement to submit the technical 
report within six weeks and the many verbal and written reminders issued by JO(BD), 
Consultant A took four months to submit its initial report, 13 months to submit its 
revised report and 18 months to submit its second revised report. Despite the 
bi-weekly progress meetings, there were five months of total inaction by Consultant A. 
Meanwhile, JO(BD) failed to give any deadline in its warning letter to Consultant A. 
 Another case was even more inconceivable, while JO(BD) and Consultant B 
were holding bi-weekly meetings to review the progress of individual cases, 
Consultant B tried to contact the complainant for five months after JO(BD) had closed 
the case.  
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4.2.2 Short Duration of Consultant Contracts 
One of the causes of the poor performance of some consultants could be the short 
duration of their contracts (maximum 12 months). It is true that the short duration has 
the advantage of giving JO greater flexibility in revising contract conditions and in 
getting rid of non-performing consultants. On the other hand, the short duration often 
means that by the time the consultant and his staff have gained sufficient knowledge 
and experience in the work, the contract is coming to an end. Moreover, it is relatively 
difficult for the consultants to recruit and retain good staff under short contracts 
without certainly of continuation or renewal. 
 
 With a better understanding of the whole outsourcing arrangement of JO in 
handling of water seepage complaints and gaining the knowledge of outsourcing in 
the literature review, the impacts to performance measurements, outsourcing 
outcomes and outsourcing relationships in the outsourcing arrangement noted by JO 
and consultants will be examined in detail in the next 2 chapters. 
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Chapter 5 - Impact of Outsourcing noted by the Joint Office 
 
In the previous chapters, the basic theory of outsourcing and the current 
outsourcing arrangement in handling water seepage complaints in Hong Kong are 
already discussed. The consistent point between the literature review and the 
outsourcing in JO is that deficiencies or impact is observed in the arrangement. This 
study aims to find out the underlying impact of outsourcing management in the 
service of handling of water seepage complaints provided by JO. To collect more data 
for the study, questionnaire surveys and interviews for JO and the consultants are the 
follow-up action to explore the current outsourcing management of JO. In this chapter, 
the perspective of JO is first presented. A questionnaire survey to the Building Safety 
Office (BSO) and 2 interviews to the Professional Officer (PO) are conducted to 
investigate the impact in the outsourcing management noted by JO. 
 
5.1 Data Collection 
 The data collection is divided into the questionnaire survey2 and the interviews3. 
 
5.1.1 Questionnaire Survey 
 The survey study of Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2001) states that outsourcing in 
the public organization is not providing goodwill to the organization. Rather, negative 
impacts occur when public service is outsourced to outside providers. Those negative 
impacts mainly put towards to the outsourcing outcome and outsourcing relationship. 
Management of outsourcing contract is not an easy task for public organizations, 
                                                 
2
 See Appendix V - Questionnaire to the Joint Office 
3
 See Appendix VII - Interview Questions to the Professional Officers 
 47
especially at post-contract stage. In the post-contract stage, performance 
measurements and contractual relationships are the critical task in outsourcing 
contract. To investigate the impact in the outsourcing management of JO, the 
performance measurements, outsourcing outcomes and outsourcing relationships are 
the three main aspects put in the questionnaire to ask the BSOs. 
 
5.1.2 Questionnaire Design 
Performance measurements 
 Despite the case study from Ombudsman (2008) shows a low quality of service 
of some consultants, this cannot conclude that the consultants are performing badly in 
providing the service. JO should keep in the position in controlling the quality of 
service. To control the consultants, BSOs have daily contact with the consultants 
monitoring the progress and performance of each case. In the performance 
measurement process, impacts such as additional workload to BSOs, poor relationship 
between the consultants and complaints may be observed. Therefore, the performance 
requirements from JO, operation performances of JO and the consultants, and reports 
performances of the consultants are included in this part to examine the view of BSOs. 
The table below shows the possible impacts found in those three areas.  
Performance 
Measurement  
Possible impacts 
Performance 
requirements 
- Performance requirements of the operation are mutually agreed 
between JO and consultants.  
- Performance requirements for different JO officers towards 
consultants are consistent.  
- Performance requirements for JO towards different consultants are 
consistent. 
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Operation 
performances 
- Consultants’ response to cases’ matters is efficient. 
- JO officers’ response to consultants’ request is efficient. 
- Consultants maintain a positive relationship with the complainants 
- JO officers maintain a positive relationship with the complainants 
- Change of the personnel of consultants affects the operation 
performance. 
- Change of the personnel of JO officers affects the operation 
performance. 
- Consultants are performing their professionalism in the operation 
Reports 
performances 
- There are too many report materials within one case 
- Quality of report submitted by consultants is always acceptable 
- Requirement for amendments in a report by consultants is seldom. 
- Requirement for resubmission of a report by the consultants is 
seldom. 
- Requirement for retest of IWSC by consultants is seldom. 
Other 
performances 
- Sanctions against the performance of consultants are adequate. 
 
Table 5.1 Possible impact in performance measurement 
 
Outsourcing outcomes 
 Outsourcing outcomes are another aspect for investigation. For any outsourcing 
contract, the outsourcing party should have some anticipated benefit to be achieved by 
outsourcing. However, the study of Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2001) claim that the 
service provision of the public organization has not benefited from outsourcing. 
Therefore, if the anticipated benefits of JO are not achieved, there will be no means 
for continuing the outsourcing practice in the operation. Despite the anticipated 
outsourcing outcomes of JO are not know at the time of setting the questionnaire, the 
general outsourcing outcomes are included in the table to investigate the views of the 
BSOs.  
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Possible outcomes 
- Cost reduction or cost increase 
- Improvement to service quality or reduction to service quality 
- Operational flexibility or operational inflexibility  
- Operational effectiveness or operational ineffectiveness 
- Effective use of JO officers or ineffective use of JO officers 
- Motivated staff or demotivated staff 
Table 5.2 Possible outcomes of outsourcing handling seepage complaints. 
 
Outsourcing relationships 
 Contractual relationship is always an important aspect in the management of any 
contracts. It is also true to outsourcing. It is believed that better relationship between 
the outsourcing organization and service providers can enhance performance of both 
parties. Adversarial relationship and disrespect between parties in outsourcing of 
public service is observed in the survey study of Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2001). In 
light of the deficiencies of JO addressed by Ombudsman, poor relationship between 
the JO and the consultants may be the hidden reasons for JO to manage and monitor 
the consultants ineffectively. So, this study also investigates the relationship between 
JO and consultants. This part focuses on whether JO and consultants share the same 
objectives and clear responsibility and have an acceptable relationship. The following 
items are given in the questionnaire to investigation the outsourcing relationship 
between the two parties 
. 
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Outsourcing Relationship 
- JO and consultants shared the same objective in the operation  
- The responsibility between JO officers and consultants are clear. 
- Co-operative or adversarial 
- Open / transparent or closed / on a need-to-know basis 
- Partnership building or strictly contractual 
- Improving or Declining  
- Flexible to emerging needs or inflexible to emerging needs 
- Respectful or disrespectful 
- Involved or distant 
Table 5.3 Possible outsourcing relationship between BSO and consultants 
 
The questionnaire to BSO is divided into three parts with performance 
measurements, outsourcing outcomes and outsourcing relationships. For the 
performance measurements, 16 statements in total are used to investigate the impacts 
related to the performance requirements from JO, operation performances of JO and 
the consultants, and reports performances of consultants. All statements are 
categorized to their own area and arranged in one matrix. The likelihood of these 
impacts is measured by the intensity of respondents’ opinions using the Likert scale. 
In the matrix, each statement is presented in a format like “multiple choice”. 
Respondents are asked to pick one of the five alternatives that indicate the extent to 
which they agree with the statement. Response options are ‘Strongly Agree’, ‘Agree’, 
‘Undecided’, ‘Disagree’ and ‘Strongly Disagree’. It should be noted that choosing 
“Undecided” means respondents ‘both agree and disagree’ or ‘neither agree nor 
disagree’ with that statements.  
For outsourcing outcomes, 6 pairs of outcomes are arranged in a matrix with the 
positive outcomes on the left opposing the negative outcomes on the right according 
to their own pairs. The likelihood of the outcomes is also measured by the intensity of 
respondents’ opinion using the Likert scale. In this matrix, respondents are asked to 
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pick one number from 1-7 that indicates the degree of agreement to the outcomes on 
the left or on the right. 
The method used for outsourcing relationships is the same as those used in the 
two above parts. The 2 statements are arranged in the multiple choice format same as 
the statements in performance measurement. Another matrix of 7 pairs of outsourcing 
relationships is constructed in the same format as the part of outsourcing outcomes. 
The measure method of the two matrixes is also the same as the corresponding one 
explained above. 
Besides, those three aspects of study in the questionnaire, questions are also set 
to collect numerical data on the monthly number of cases handle by the respondents, 
monthly number of district involved in the cases, monthly number of cases handled by 
the respondents was outsourced to consultants and the number of consultants involved 
in the respondents’ outsourced cases. Respondents are allowed to answer in ranges, so 
it is easier for not trying to state the exact figure. In addition, respondents are asked if 
there are improvements or suggestion to the outsourcing arrangement of JO at the 
final part of the questionnaire.  
 
5.1.3 Responses to Questionnaire Survey 
In this questionnaire, 48 BSOs were invited for participation through email. 
There were 18 respondents in the survey which is about 38% of the population size.  
 
5.1.4 Survey findings 
 After finishing the questionnaire survey, answers of each respondent are 
recorded for measurement. For the matrix with statements, values of 1 to 5 are 
assigned to the 5 response options. The higher scores represent more positive attitudes 
towards the statements while the lower scores are vice versa. The mean score from all 
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respondents for each statement then indicates the respondents’ degree of agreement or 
disagreement with that statement. For example, the scores of 18 respondents on one 
statement are calculated to find mean score of that statement. If the mean score is 2.2, 
this indicates that the likelihood of the respondents is ‘Agree’ for that statement. The 
table below shows the score and the range of mean score for the corresponding 
option. 
Response Options Score Range of Mean Score 
Strongly Agree 1 1-1.7 
Agree 2 1.8-2.5 
Undecided 3 2.6-3.4 
Disagree 4 3.4-4.2 
Strongly Disagree 5 4.3-5 
Table 5.4 The score and range of mean score of each response options 
 For the matrix of opposing pairs, including in the parts of outsourcing outcomes 
and outsourcing relationships, values of 1 to 7 represent the respondents’ degree of 
agreement to the items on the left or on the right. The lower scores indicate the more 
positive aspects of the outcomes or the relationships while the higher scores are vice 
versa. Similar to the calculation in the matrix for statements, the mean score from all 
respondents for each pair of items then indicates the respondents’ degree of agreement 
with that item. The findings of the questionnaire survey and the 2 interviews are 
summarized and discussed in the following parts.  
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Performance measurements 
I.  Performance requirements 
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Figure 5.1 Results of questionnaire statements about performance requirements 
 
Statements Mean Score Standard 
deviation 
1. Performance requirements of Investigation of 
Water Seepage Complaints (IWSC) were 
mutually agreed between JO and consultants. 
2.22 
(Agree) 
1.00?
2. Performance requirements for different JO 
officers towards consultants are consistent. 
2.89 
(Undecided) 
1.02?
3. Performance requirements for JO towards 
different consultants are consistent. 
2.67 
(Undecided) 
0.97?
Table 5.5 Findings of the questionnaire statements about performance requirements 
 
For statement 1, the questionnaire survey showed that more than half of the 
respondents agreed to it and this statement reached the mean score of ‘Agree’. This is 
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likely to be a statement agreed by BSOs. At the time the consultants submitting 
tenders for the outsourced work, they should know the performance requirements for 
the whole operation. So after the consultants are awarded with contracts, all BSOs 
should understand that both the JO and the consultants are acting under the terms of 
the outsourcing contract and the performance requirements should be mutually agreed 
between them. 
For statement 2 and 3, their mean scores reached the ‘Undecided’ level. One 
third of the respondents chose ‘Undecided’ for these two statements. So it cannot be 
ascertained that there are impacts in these two areas in the outsourcing arrangement. It 
is believed that performance requirements of different JO officers are generally 
consistent. However, personal differences in judgment between BSOs are something 
that cannot be avoided. For example, some BSOs may be even very straight to the 
minor amendments of the report while some may not. This may explain why the result 
is at the ‘Undecided’ level. For the requirements towards different consultants, BSOs 
mostly handle cases from two consultants. They actually do not know the 
performance requirements towards the consultants who are out of their monitoring. So, 
it seems that BSOs cannot be certain for this statement. In the interviews, it is found 
that performance requirements to different consultants are the same in their contracts. 
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II. Operation performances 
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Figure 5.2 Results of questionnaire statements about operation performances 
 
Statements Mean Score Standard 
deviation 
1. Consultants’ response to cases’ matters is 
efficient. 
2.28 
(Agree) 
0.89 
2. JO officers’ response to consultants’ request is 
efficient. 
1.72 
(Strongly 
agree) 
0.67 
3. Consultants maintain a positive relationship with 
the complainants 
3.17 
(Undecided) 
0.99 
4. JO officers maintain a positive relationship with 
the complainants 
3.28 
(Undecided) 
0.89 
5. Change of the personnel of consultants affects 
the operation performance. 
1.89 
(Agree) 
0.76 
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6. Change of the personnel of JO officers affects 
the operation performance. 
2.11 
(Agree) 
0.96 
7. Consultants are performing their professionalism 
in IWSC. 
2.39 
(Agree) 
0.78 
Table 5.6 Findings of the questionnaire statements about performance requirements 
 
Most of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed to statement 1 and 2 which 
reached mean score levels at ‘Agree’ and ‘Strongly agree’ respectively. So, the BSOs 
agreed that both the consultants and they are efficient in handling the cases’ matters.  
For statement 3 and 4, the mean score located at the ‘Undecided’ level which 
indicated that the relationships for BSOs or the consultants with complaints are varied 
for different cases. The bar chat showed that there are respondents answering ‘Agree’ 
or ‘Disagree’ to the statements. 
For statement 5 and 6, BSOs agree that change of the personnel in either 
consultants or JO officers would affect the operation performances. When even there 
is change of the personnel in either of the parties, cases of the original staff have to be 
transferred to another staff. So, the new staff for those cases has to start over again in 
reviewing the cases and communicating with the other parties. More time is then 
consumed. This may cause an impact in delay of handling seepage complaints. 
However, change of personnel is not frequent in JO so the impact will not be great.  
For statement 7, more than half of the respondents agreed it. BSOs agreed that 
the consultants are performing their professionalism in the inspection work.  
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III. Report performances 
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Figure 5.3 Results of questionnaire statements about report performances 
 
Statements Mean Score Standard 
deviation 
1. There are too many report materials within one 
case of IWSC 
3.56 
(Disagree) 
1.20 
2. Quality of report submitted by consultants is 
always acceptable  
4.06 
(Disagree) 
0.73 
3. Requirement for amendments in a report by 
consultants is seldom. 
4.67 
(Strongly 
disagree) 
0.59 
4. Requirement for resubmission of a report by the 
consultants is seldom.  
4.06 
(Disagree) 
0.73 
5. Requirement for retest of IWSC by consultants is 
seldom. 
2.22 0.73 
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(Agree) 
Table 5.7 Findings of the questionnaire statements about report performances 
 
For statement 1, it reached the mean score of ‘Disagree’. It is believed that the 
report materials of the seepage cases should not be too brief. It is because the reports 
can be the evidence in court showing the seepage causes or source of seepage in the 
particular cases. Therefore, the reports should be comprehensive and show a 
professional study of the seepage case. 
For statement 2 to 4, respondents showed their disagreement to the statement. It 
reveals that quality of reports submitted by the consultants is always unacceptable. 
Amendments or even resubmission are always required for the reports of the 
consultants. This indicates that reports submitted by the consultants seldom reach the 
required level. This would give impact to the outsourced work. Amendments and 
resubmission can cause much delay to endorse the report by JO. As a result, it cause 
delay in giving the result to complainants. 
For statement 5, the mean score reached the ‘Agree’ level, so there are seldom 
retests for the consultants’ work. This indicates that the inspection work conducted by 
the consultants are general acceptable, but the performance of the consultants’ 
reporting skills has a room for improvement.  
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IV. Other performances measurements 
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Figure 5.4 Results of questionnaire statements about other performances 
 
Statements Mean Score Standard 
deviation 
1. Sanctions against the performance of consultants 
are adequate. 
3.06 
(Undecided) 
0.94 
Table 5.8 Findings of the questionnaire statements about other performances 
  
 The mean score reached ‘Undecided’ of this statement. Respondents are neither 
agree nor disagree to whether sanctions against the performance of the consultants are 
adequate. However, one third of the respondents agree this while another one third of 
the respondents disagree this. This shows that the degree of sanctions against the 
consultants has room for discussion but this can not be decided if there are any impact 
towards the outsourcing management of JO.  
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Outsourcing outcomes 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
a) Cost reduction        Cost increase 
b) Improvement to 
service quality 
       
Reduction to 
service quality 
c) Operational 
flexibility 
       
Operational 
inflexibility 
d) Operational 
effectiveness 
       
Operational 
ineffectiveness 
e) Effective use of 
JO officers 
       
Ineffective use 
of JO officers 
f) Motivated staff        
Demotivated 
staff 
Table 5.9 Findings of the questionnaire about outsourcing outcomes 
 
 Out of the six outsourcing outcomes, the overall view of all respondents is 
summarized in the table above. The table shows that outsourcing of handling water 
seepage complaints can achieve cost reduction, operational flexibility, operational 
effectiveness and effective use of JO officers. However, the result shows that the 
outsourcing arrangement actually cause reduction or no improvement to service 
quality and demotivated staff. These two impacts will be further explained in the 
interview section of this chapter. 
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Outsourcing relationships 
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Figure 5.5 Results of questionnaire statements about outsourcing relationships 
 
Statements Mean Score Standard 
deviation 
1. JO and consultants shared the same objective in 
IWSC. 
4.06 
(Disagree) 
1.16 
2. The responsibility between JO officers and 
consultants are clear. 
1.72 
(Strongly 
agree) 
0.75 
Table 5.10 Findings of the questionnaire statements about outsourcing relationships 
 
For statement 1, 14 out of 18 respondents chose ‘Disagree’ or ‘Strongly disagree’. 
Also, the mean score reached the ‘Disagree’ level. This indicates that BSOs thinks 
that JO and the consultants are not sharing the same objectives in handling seepage 
complaints. This is believed to be true. The consultants are actually the private sectors 
who are money minded while JO is concerning the community needs.  
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For statement 2, BSOs show ‘Strongly agree’ as the mean score level. This 
reveals that the responsibility between JO and the consultants are actually clear.  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
a) Co-operative        Adversarial 
b) Open / 
Transparent 
       
Closed / on a 
need-to-know basis 
c) Partnership 
building 
       Strictly contractual 
d) Improving        Declining 
e) Flexible to 
emerging needs 
       
Inflexible to 
emerging needs 
f) Respectful        Disrespectful 
g) Involved        Distant 
Table 5.11 Findings of the questionnaire about outsourcing relationships 
 
The table above shows the result of all respondents towards their relationships 
with the consultants. In general, the result stands at to the left side of the table which 
indicates that BSOs are achieving an acceptable relationship with the consultants. 
BSOs agreed that the relationship between consultants and them are co-operative, 
open, partnership building, improving, flexible to emerging needs, respectful and 
involved. However, item d score the highest score in the survey. This may mean that 
outsourcing relationships between the consultants and JO are not quite improving at 
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the moment of the study.  
 
5.1.5 Interviews 
 For deeper understanding, interviews are another important method for the study. 
At the time the questionnaire survey was in process, Mr. Albert Wong and Ms. Ruby 
Tang were invited to have an individual interview about the impacts in the 
outsourcing management of JO in handling water seepage complaints. Mr. Wong is 
the Head of Professional Officer of JO 1 and Ms. Tang is the Professional Officer of 
JO 1. During the interview, questions about the three aspects, performance 
measurements, outsourcing outcomes and outsourcing relationships, are the main 
focuses. Both of them gave valuable experience and opinions which are extremely 
useful for this study.  
 
Performance measurement 
In respect to performance measurement, JO is actually improving from the start 
of JO in 2006 until now. For the outsourcing contract in 2006 and 2007, no timeline 
was set in the terms of the contract to control when should the consultants to start 
investigation, when should the test be done and when the report should submitted. 
However, timelines are set in the contract of 2008 and 2009. For example, consultants 
should finish the first inspection in 2 weeks times and report should be submitted 
within 6 weeks after all tests are completed.  
In order to monitor the performance of consultants, there are two mechanisms. 
First, PO would conduct bi-weekly progress meeting with the consultants, progress of 
case, unsatisfactory performance and problem encountered by consultants would be 
discussed in the meeting. Second, three-month interim appraisal report will be 
prepared by PO to give a holistic view of the performance of the consultants but not 
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side tracking on small issue. PO will comment on the progress, technical knowledge, 
desk study, relationship with complainants and UC, awareness of Government policy 
and procedure, responsibility, timelines of report, standard of reports, submit accounts 
(payment) of the consultants. There will grading over the work of consultants which is 
very good, good, satisfactory, acceptable, poor and very poor. For the consultants who 
have very poor performance in the outsourced work or have not improved in progress, 
PO may issue warning letter to give warning signal to the consultants. If such letter 
does not work, further warning letter may be then given the Head of PO and there will 
be an interview for the particular consultants understanding why they perform so 
badly. Obviously, no consultants want to receive adversary letter or warning letter 
since these will affect their assessment for tendering further outsourcing contract in 
JO.  
Despite the mechanisms of monitoring the performance of consultants, 
interviewee pointed out that there are still deficiencies in the following areas where it 
is difficult to be control by JO: 
- Internal management of consultants 
While JO keeps looking at the progress of the consultants, the internal 
management of consultants cannot be controlled by JO. Interviewees revealed that 
sometimes it is difficult to ask for relevant information for cases handled by 
consultants. Some consultants would employ somebody sitting at the office and 
receive call from JO. So, this guy may not be any technical staff of the consultants 
or even have no knowledge about water seepage issue. The result is that JO cannot 
get the information of cases directly from the consultants. Even worse, some staff 
of consultants seldom receives calls from JO.  
Another problem will arise when consultants are awarded with the outsourcing 
contract of handling water seepage complaints for two successive years. Within 
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the contract term of one year, JO issues Work Orders to consultants by week. The 
quota of cases issued to consultants would be limited by the capped amount of 
payment in the contract. In general, $3 million is capped for each contract. So, 
until the end of the contract, there will be no more new cases issued to the 
consultants but it is obviously that numerous cases are still outstanding for 
inspection or preparing reports. Normally, it lasts for 1 and a half year to finish all 
the cases for one contract. However, when consultants have contracts for two 
successive years, when the cases of the previous contract have not come to an end, 
new Work Orders are issued for the new contract. This may cause large amount of 
cases cumulated in the particular consultants. Consultants may not be able to 
manage such large amount of workload and cases. Poor performance may be as a 
result. 
Another matter related to contract is that different consultants have different 
mechanisms in weighting the payment. Some consultants have higher weighting 
for tests conducted while some have higher weighting for reports submitted. This 
will cause different incentive to consultants in handling the cases. For the former 
one, consultants will pay attention to conducting tests to investigate the source of 
seepage. However, the latter one will try to earn more ‘report money’ and perform 
less care about the source of seepage, the investigation method or the reports 
contents. Therefore, it is likely to result in poor performances of consultants. 
Amendment to reports, resubmission of reports or even audit check is then 
required to ensure the quality of the cases. This also gives a reason why there are 
always amendments in the consultants’ reports causing additional workload to JO 
staff. 
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- Communication with complaints 
It is always the case that complaints are too hurry in knowing the result of the 
investigation. They may keep calling the consultants or BSO to find out the 
progress of their complaints. In the pledge4 of JO, complaints should have 
received a letter stating that JO will complete the investigation and inform the 
complainant of the outcome within 90 working days. Of course, BSO will try to 
find the consultants to understand the progress or the situation of the cases. 
However, this come back to the difficulty in finding the consultants which is  
mentioned above about the internal management of consultants. Sometimes, 
consultants may be active in replying the complaints since there are too many 
cases. They will try to prolong the time by not giving reply. 
 
- Communication and assess problems to undercomplainants (UC) 
Interviewees revealed that for any seepage complaints handled by JO, they should 
not be easy cases. Before the seepage complaints, it is likely that the complainants 
have already discussed about the seepage issue with the undercomplainants (UC). 
Undercomplainant is the owner of the premises where is suspected to be the 
source of seepage. Therefore, seepage complaints will come to JO until they 
cannot make a duel for the seepage issue. At the moment of the complaints, it is 
obvious that the complainants and the UC are not in good relationship. When JO 
or JO’s consultants steps in to handle the matter, it is common that adversary 
relationship occurs between UC and JO/consultants. This most likely leads to the 
assess problem to the suspected premises of UC for conducting investigation and 
testing. There have been cases that UC rejects any inspection staff to enter the 
                                                 
4
 See Appendix XI – Notices to Owners, this letter will be issued to complainants by post after the call 
for water seepage complaints.  
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premises. Although JO can apply for warrant to enter the premises, the 
consequence would be delay for process of whole case.  
- Sudden increase in number of cases 
Interviewees pointed out that cases may increases shapely for raining season or 
when there is news about JO in handling water seepage complaints. With the staff 
of JO or staff consultants are limited in handling seepage complaints, sudden 
increase of cases will cause decrease in human resources in handling the seepage 
complaints. Delay causing to each cases may then be resulted in those periods. 
Complainants may then complaints about the delay of work. However, JO has no 
power to control the number of cases handled by it.  
 
Despite the deficiencies, both interviewees agreed that the quality of service of 
consultants generally reaches the acceptable standard. Moreover, they can observe 
that consultants are improving their quality of work. 
 
Outsourcing outcomes 
Before discussing the impacts in outsourcing outcomes, we should first 
understand the reasons for JO to outsource the inspection works. The main reason is 
that there is not enough staff for in-house operation. Rather than employing more 
in-house staff, JO implements outsourcing which greater flexibility to the 
investigation work. For handling the seepage complaints in-house, human resources 
are actually not enough to handle the number of cases existing now. One of the 
interviewee gave the rough number of cases in each year starting from the set up of 
JO.  
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Year No. of cases 
2006 (July-Dec) 3000 
2007 (Whole year) 17500 
2008 (Whole year) 21700 
Table 5.12 The rough number of seepage cases in JO from 2006-2008 
The table shows that there are about 4000 cases more in 2008 than in 2007. This 
indicates a roughly 24% increase of seepage cases from 2007 to 2008. So, outsourcing 
the inspection work can let JO to be more flexible in total number of staff in handling 
the increase number of seepage complaints. JO would only have to concern the 
in-house management staff in monitoring the outsourcing contracts. Besides, 
inspection officers always face the problem of appointed the complainants and UC for 
investigation since most of them have to work at normal working hours (9am-6pm). 
The working time of the consultants is much flexible than JO staff as the consultants 
are not bounded by the government employment contract. For example, consultants 
can even have investigation at 11pm. Without the control under the government policy 
towards their employee, the consultants are claimed to be more flexible in working 
hours, financial resources, number of staff, location of office and administration work. 
It is not impossible for achieving the flexibility in-house, but the costs are predicted to 
be much higher than outsourcing.  
From the view of both interviewees, they agreed that the expected outcomes of 
outsourcing the inspection works are basically achieved. Outsourcing can give JO 
human resources to handle the large number of seepage complaints in Hong Kong. In 
addition, consultants are not only more available in time to appoint the complainants 
and UC for investigation, but also flexible in locating at place near to the seepage 
cases they are handling. Consultants can set their office at the location near to the 
district and handle the seepage complaints at that districts. For instance, one 
consultant is located at Yuen Long to handle the cases over there while the staff of JO 
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in monitoring that consultant is actually located at Chai Wan.  
In responding to the result form the questionnaire about outsourcing outcomes, it 
is difficult to tell that outsourcing is the only reasons causing the impacts of reduction 
in service quality and demotivated staff. Interviewees revealed that although the 
consultants may not perform well in the inspection work, there are many other 
uncontrollable factors to the service quality such as the access problem to the 
suspected premises, the misunderstanding between complainants and the consultants, 
etc. Neither JO nor consultants can solve such uncontrollable factors to the operation.  
For the outcome of demotivated staff, interviewees pointed out that JO staff is 
demotivated by the handling of water seepage complaints rather than the outsourcing 
arrangement itself. It is because even outsourcing is implemented, the capped amount 
in the outsourcing contract is not enough cover all seepage cases. For the extra cases, 
BSOs are the only human resources to handle the seepage complaints. On one hand, 
BSOs have to monitoring the work of the consultants. On the other hand, they also 
have cases to be handled by them. The administration work of outsourcing 
arrangement and the inspection work of seepage cases together give a large workload 
to each BSOs. It is believed that JO is facing the problem of lack of financial and 
human resources. 
 
Outsourcing relationships 
Both interviewees revealed that JO and consultants are not sharing the same 
objective in handling seepage complaints. It is obvious that JO aims at abating the 
nuisance for public while consultants are money-minded. However, this does not 
affect their relationship, interviewees agreed the relationship between JO and 
consultant is cooperative. It is common to see adversary communication between 
consultants and JO on particular items when JO has to control the quality of work, but 
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this does not affect the actual relationships between them. 
 
Other issues 
In terms of the outsourcing management, interviewees pointed out that there is 
room of improvement for JO and also the consultants. However, when considering the 
quality of service provided by JO or the consultants, it cannot be denied that many 
uncontrollable problems related to complainants or UC are affecting the overall 
performance of the operation. Therefore, both interviewees emphasized the role of JO 
is to assist the public to abate the nuisance where the action is enforced under the 
Public Health and Municipal Services Ordinance. JO is not aiming to identity the 
source of seepage in each case. So, JO is only the third party that public can ask for 
when they really cannot solve the problem of water seepage by themselves. There is a 
misunderstanding in the public that JO can help them to solve the seepage problems. 
Once the complainants find that the result of the work is not the same as their 
expectation, they argued that JO is not performing well. This may be related to the 
civil education on the view of the public.   
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Chapter 6 – Impact of Outsourcing noted by the Consultants 
 
After knowing the findings from JO, the perspective now changes to the 
consultants’ point of view. Consultants, acting as the service providers of JO, are the 
other party who can greatly influence the quality of service or the overall outsourcing 
arrangement. Understanding the perspective of the consultants can give a more 
holistic view over the impact of outsourcing in JO. A questionnaire survey to all staff 
of the consultants and 2 interviews to consultant representatives were conducted to 
investigate the issue noted by consultants. 
 
6.1 Data Collection 
The data collection is divided into the questionnaire survey5 and the interviews6. 
 
6.1.1 Questionnaire Survey 
 The questionnaire to the consultants is very similar to the one to the JO. It also 
focuses on those three aspects which are the performance measurements, outsourcing 
outcomes and outsourcing relationships.  
 
6.1.2 Questionnaire Design 
The differences between the questionnaires to JO and to consultants are that 
those statements or items cannot be answered by consultants are deleted from the 
questionnaire and the subject of some statements is changed to consultants. The table 
below shows the 15 possible impacts in the aspects of performance measurement.  
                                                 
5
 See Appendix VIII - Questionnaire to the Consultants 
6
 See Appendix X - Interview Questions to the Consultants 
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Performance 
Measurement  
Possible impacts 
Performance 
requirements 
- Performance requirements of the operation are mutually agreed 
between JO and consultants.  
- Performance requirements for different JO officers towards 
consultants are consistent.  
Operation 
performances 
- Consultants’ response to cases’ matters is efficient. 
- JO officers’ response to consultants’ request is efficient. 
- Consultants maintain a positive relationship with the complainants 
- JO officers maintain a positive relationship with the complainants 
- Change of the personnel of consultants affects the operation 
performance. 
- Change of the personnel of JO officers affects the operation 
performance. 
- Consultants are performing their professionalism in the operation 
Reports 
performances 
- There are too many report materials within one case 
- Quality of report submitted by consultants is always acceptable 
- Requirement for amendments in a report by consultants is seldom. 
- Requirement for resubmission of a report by the consultants is 
seldom. 
- Requirement for retest of IWSC by consultants is seldom. 
Other 
performances 
- Sanctions against the performance of consultants are adequate. 
 
Table 6.1 Possible impact in performance measurement 
  
 For the part of outsourcing outcomes and outsourcing relationships, they are 
almost the same as the questionnaire for JO except one difference. The pair of ‘Cost 
reduction’ and ‘Cost increase’, ‘Effective use of JO officers’ and ‘Ineffective use of 
JO officers’, ‘Motivated staff’ and ‘Demotivated staff’ and ‘Open / Transparent’ and 
‘Closed / on a need to know basis’ are excluded from the questionnaire since 
consultants are not the outsourcing parties of the contract. The table below shows the 
items included in the questionnaire of these two parts. 
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Possible outcomes 
- Improvement to service quality or reduction to service quality 
- Operational flexibility or operational inflexibility  
- Operational effectiveness or operational ineffectiveness 
Table 6.2 Possible outcomes of outsourcing handling seepage complaints. 
 
Outsourcing Relationship 
- JO and consultants shared the same objective in the operation  
- The responsibility between JO officers and consultants are clear. 
- Co-operative or adversarial 
- Partnership building or strictly contractual 
- Improving or Declining  
- Flexible to emerging needs or inflexible to emerging needs 
- Respectful or disrespectful 
- Involved or distant 
Table 6.3 Possible outsourcing relationship between BSO and consultants 
 
 With the similar questionnaire, same methods are adopted to design the 
questionnaire. The methods are referred to Section 5.1.1. Also, consultants are asked 
about the numerical data on the monthly number of cases handled by respondents and 
the number of district involved in respondents’ cases.  
 
6.1.3 Responses to Questionnaire Survey 
In this questionnaire, 9 consultants were invited for participation through email. 
It is assumed that a population size of 108 staff is invited for the questionnaire. 23 
responses were received which were accounted for 21% of the population size. 
 
6.1.4 Survey findings 
 The results of this questionnaire survey are analyzed in the same way as the 
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previous one. For the matrix with statements, values of 1 to 5 are assigned to the 5 
response options. The higher scores represent more positive attitudes towards the 
statements while the lower scores are vice versa. The mean score from all respondents 
for each statement then indicates the respondents’ degree of agreement or 
disagreement with that statement. For example, the scores of 23 respondents on one 
statement are calculated to find mean score of that statement. If the mean score is 2.2, 
this indicates that the likelihood of the respondents is ‘Agree’ for that statement. The 
table below shows the score and the range of mean score for the corresponding 
option. 
Response Options Score Range of Mean Score 
Strongly Agree 1 1-1.7 
Agree 2 1.8-2.5 
Undecided 3 2.6-3.4 
Disagree 4 3.4-4.2 
Strongly Disagree 5 4.3-5 
Table 6.4 The score and range of mean score of each response options 
 For the matrix of opposing pairs, including in the parts of outsourcing outcomes 
and outsourcing relationships, values of 1 to 7 represent the respondents’ degree of 
agreement to the items on the left or on the right. The lower scores indicate the more 
positive aspects of the outcomes or the relationships while the higher scores are vice 
versa. Similar to the calculation in the matrix for statements, the mean score from all 
respondents for each pair of items then indicates the respondents’ degree of agreement 
with that item. The findings of the questionnaire survey and the 2 interviews are 
summarized and discussed in the following parts.  
 
 75
Performance measurements 
I. Performance requirements 
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Figure 6.1 Results of questionnaire statements about performance requirements 
 
Statements Mean Score Standard 
deviation 
1. Performance requirements of IWSC were 
mutually agreed between consultants and JO. 
2.26 
(Agree) 
1.05?
2. Performance requirements for different JO 
officers towards consultants are consistent. 
2.39 
(Agree) 
1.03?
Table 6.5 Findings of the questionnaire statements about performance requirements 
 
For statement 1, the questionnaire survey showed that more than half of the 
respondents agreed to it and this statement reached the mean score of ‘Agree’. This is 
likely to be agreed by consultants because consultants are performing under the 
specification of the contract which is signed after the award of the contract. 
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For statement 2, their mean scores reached the ‘Agree’ level. It meant that 
performance requirements from different officers of JO are actually consistent. In 
general, the BSOs who monitor the consultants always keep the same. Also, the BSOs 
responsible for each consultants generally are leaded by the some PO. So it is likely 
that the performance requirements for each consultant are consistent. 
 
II. Operation performances 
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Figure 6.2 Results of questionnaire statements about operation performances 
 
Statements Mean Score Standard 
deviation 
1. Consultant’s response to cases’ matters is 
efficient. 
1.87 
(Agree) 
0.87 
2. JO officers’ response to consultants’ request is 
efficient. 
2.13 
(Agree) 
1.01 
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3. Consultant maintains a positive relationship with 
the complainants 
3.35 
(Undecided) 
0.98 
4. JO officers maintain a positive relationship with 
the complainants 
2.65 
(Undecided) 
0.78 
5. Change of the personnel of consultants affects 
the operation performance. 
3.52 
(Disagree) 
0.95 
6. Change of the personnel of JO officers affects 
the operation performance. 
3.3 
(Undecided) 
1.11 
7. Consultants are performing their professionalism 
in IWSC. 
1.83 
(Agree) 
0.90 
Table 6.6 Findings of the questionnaire statements about performance requirements 
 
Most of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed to statement 1 and 2 which 
reached mean score levels at ‘Agree’ and ‘Strongly agree’ respectively. So, the 
consultants agreed that both JO and they are efficient in handling the cases’ matters.  
For statement 3 and 4, the mean score located at the ‘Undecided’ level which 
indicated that the relationships for consultants or JO with complaints are varied for 
different cases. The bar chat showed that there are respondents answering ‘Agree’ or 
‘Disagree’ to the statements and most of them chose ‘Undecided’.  
For statement 5 and 6, consultants disagreed that change of the personnel in 
consultants would affect the operation performances while they showed ‘Undecided’ 
for change of personnel in JO. Whether the change of personnel would affect the 
operation of cases really depends on the management style of the consultants. Good 
internal management of consultants should capable to encounter the effect efficiently. 
It is believed that change of personnel in JO would not give much effect to the 
 78
operation of consultants as the contact point between consultants and JO would most 
likely focus at the PO.  
For statement 7, more than half of the respondents agreed it. Consultants agreed 
that they are performing their professionalism in the inspection work. It is believed to 
be agreed by consultants because if consultants are not professional in the work, JO 
should not outsource the work to them.  
 
III. Report performances 
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Figure 6.3 Results of questionnaire statements about report performances 
 
Statements Mean Score Standard 
deviation 
1. There are too many report materials within one 
case of IWSC. 
3.35 
(Undecided) 
0.88 
2. Quality of report submitted by consultants is 
always acceptable. 
2.78 
(Undecided) 
0.85 
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3. Requirement for amendments in a report by 
consultants is seldom. 
3.57 
(Disagree) 
0.05 
4. Requirement for resubmission of a report by the 
consultants is seldom.  
2.43 
(Agree) 
1.04 
5. Requirement for retest of IWSC by consultants is 
seldom. 
2.09 
(Agree) 
0.67 
Table 6.7 Findings of the questionnaire statements about report performances 
 
For statement 1, it reached the mean score of ‘Undecided’. Actually, there is a 
standard form of report given to consultants to provide relevant information in the 
report. Therefore, the report materials are actually essential for consultants to submit.  
For statement 2, most respondents chose ‘Undecided’. As the one to check the 
reports is not the consultants themselves, they have no idea on this statement. 
For statement 3, consultants disagreed that the amendments for report is seldom. 
For statement 4 and 5, respondents showed their agreement to the statement. This 
indicates that the inspection work conducted by consultants are general acceptable, 
but the performance of the consultants’ reporting skills has a room for improvement. 
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IV. Other performances measurements 
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Figure 6.4 Results of questionnaire statements about other performances 
 
Statements Mean Score Standard 
deviation 
1. Sanctions against the performance of consultants 
are adequate. 
2.04 
(Agree) 
0.88 
Table 6.8 Findings of the questionnaire statements about other performances 
 
The mean score reached ‘Agree’ for this statement. It is obvious that consultants 
would agree that sanctions are adequate for consultants. 
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Outsourcing outcomes 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
a) Improvement to 
service quality 
 
      
Reduction to 
service quality 
b) Operational 
flexibility 
       
Operational 
inflexibility 
c) Operational 
effectiveness 
       
Operational 
ineffectiveness 
Table 6.9 Findings of the questionnaire about outsourcing outcomes 
 
 Although consultants are the service providers rather than the outsourcing party, 
they were also asked about the outsourcing outcome of JO. The result showed that 
consultants generally agree that JO can achieve those three items in the outsourcing 
arrangement.  
 
Outsourcing relationships 
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Figure 6.5 Results of questionnaire statements about outsourcing relationships 
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Statements Mean Score Standard 
deviation 
1. JO and consultants shared the same objective in 
IWSC. 
2.39 
(Agree) 
1.08 
2. The responsibility between JO officers and 
consultants are clear. 
2.17 
(Agree) 
0.94 
Table 6.10 Findings of the questionnaire statements about outsourcing relationships 
For statement 1, it is interesting that this statement showed ‘Disagree’ in the 
questionnaire to BSOs while it showed ‘Agree’ in the questionnaire to consultants. 
The reasons for this would be discussed in the Interview part.  
For statement 2, Consultants show ‘Agree’ as the mean score level. This reveals 
that the responsibility between JO and consultants are actually clear. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
a) Co-operative        Adversarial 
b) Partnership 
building 
       Strictly contractual 
c) Improving        Declining 
d) Flexible to 
emerging needs 
       
Inflexible to 
emerging needs 
e) Respectful        Disrespectful 
f) Involved        Distant 
Table 6.11 Findings of the questionnaire about outsourcing relationships 
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The table above shows the result of all respondents towards their relationships 
with JO. In general, the result shifts to the left side of the table which indicates that 
consultants are having a acceptable relationship with JO. Consultants agreed that the 
relationship between JO and them are co-operative, partnership building, improving, 
flexible to emerging needs, respectful and involved. 
 
6.1.5 .Interviews 
 Interviews are also conducted for deeper understanding of the views of 
consultants. While conducting the questionnaire survey, Mr. Kelvin Shek, Ms. Pauling 
Cheung and Mr. Dicky Chow were invite to have an individual interview about the 
issue. Mr. Kelvin Shek is the Senior Project Manager of Wealthy Gate Architects and 
Associates Limited. Ms. Pauling Cheung and Mr. Dicky Chow are respectively the 
Assistant Project Manager and the Technical Staff of DCL Consultants Limited. 
During the interview, questions about the three aspects, performance measurement, 
outsourcing outcomes and outsourcing relationship, are also the main focuses. Both of 
them gave valuable experience and opinions which are extremely useful for this study.  
 
Performance measurements 
 For performance measurements, both interviewees agreed that the performance 
requirements from JO have been improved and are now very clear to consultants. 
They revealed that the contract terms in the outsourcing contract for 2009 are more 
clearly defined. Besides, the bi-weekly meeting of Professional Officers of JO and 
consultant representatives is a very good contact point for both parties. On one way 
that JO can monitor the progress of the consultants, consultants can explain their 
difficulties in handling seepage complaints by a face to face interaction with JO. 
Therefore, the communication between both parties largely increases.  
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 In respect to the internal management of consultants, both interviewees claim 
that their companies get an acceptable efficiency and quality in handling the 
outsourced work. For the cases addressing their low quality of service especially to 
delay of work, they argue that consultants are actually bounded by uncontrollable 
factors. The main difficulty faced by consultants is the communication problem with 
UC. It is common that UC would not be co-operative with consultants. So, without 
the consent from UC to conduct investigation or tests in the suspected premises, no 
conclusion can be draw to the seepage complaints. This will then lead to delay of 
reports submission. Both interviewees claim that this kind of difficulty is understood 
by JO but not by the complaints.  
Other uncontrollable factors are the inaccurate information from FEHD and 
existing situation of suspected premises. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
outsourcing is only implemented at Stage III of the procedure in handling seepage 
complaints. At Stage II, there are already some tests conducted by staff of FEHD. All 
information about those tests will be given to consultants for reference when 
consultants have to handle the cases in Stage III. However, due to some unknown 
reasons, the information given to consultants may be misleading or incorrect. So 
consultants have to start the investigation again from the beginning. The addition 
work will then cause more time for the investigation and may lead to delay of work. 
Besides, consultants may face cases that the suspected premises are not quite suitable 
for conducting tests. So, they have to ask the advice from JO before they conduct any 
works. Although this factor would affect the consultants’ investigation work, they do 
not often happen. Both interviewees emphasize that the technical procedure of the 
outsourced work is actually straight forward to the staff, but the difficulties in 
communicating with the complainants or UC are the biggest obstacle to in handling 
seepage complaints.. 
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Interviewees thought that inconsistence for different Professional Officers does 
exist in the outsourcing management. They pointed out that the quality of works done 
by consultants would really depend on the management style of the Professional 
Officers of JO. If the Professional Officer is more insistent in managing and 
monitoring the consultants, the quality of work provide by consultants would also be 
higher. 
For the high number of amendments in regards to report performance, they 
claimed that those amendments are just typing mistakes or minor errors in most cases. 
Actually, the amendments would lead to delay in endorsing the reports but would not 
give great effect to the whole operation. In case of resubmission, the main reason for 
this is due to different point of view from JO and consultants in respect to the 
particular cases. Without looking at the real situation of the case, JO may give 
different interpretation to the cases and require additional work for consultants. In 
general, resubmission of report is seldom and consultants are always cooperative in 
handling the case.  
 
Outsourcing outcomes 
 Both interviewees agreed that the motivation for JO to outsource the work is lack 
of human resources. They thought that it is impossible for JO to acquire large amount 
of technical staff for in-house operation. Instead, it is more economical and financial 
feasible for JO to outsourced the work to the market. In addition, managing 
outsourcing contract by JO would be easier than managing in-house operation. One of 
the interviewee pointed out the most important reason for outsourcing, efficiency of 
handling water seepage complaints have been largely increased than the Tripartite 
Arrangement of the three departments (FEHD, BD and WSD) in the past. Another 
interviewee also stated that outsourcing the operation is beneficial to JO in terms of 
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time, cost and quality.  
 
Outsourcing relationships 
 Interviewees agreed that they are keeping a good relationship with JO. They 
think that the bi-weekly meeting has given much contribution to their relationship. 
The bi-weekly meeting on one hand gives an effective management on the progress of 
consultants and on the other hand provides a platform for improving their 
relationships. Moreover, the responsibilities between JO and consultants have been 
more clearly defined.  
 In respect to the objective of consultants in the outsourced work, 
‘money-minded’ is a must in the management level. However, in the frontline level 
who handles the seepage complaints, staff of consultants also considers the needs of 
complaints just like want JO does.  
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Chapter 7 – Conclusion 
 
7.1 Summary of Findings and Recommendations 
 After the whole process of literature review, questionnaire survey and interviews, 
the study discover that the actual outsourcing arrangement of handling water seepage 
complaints has been managed by the Joint Office (JO) in a satisfactory standard. No 
serious negative impact is observed in the outsourcing practice. Although the result of 
the study does not support the hypothesis, it does give a further insight to handling of 
water seepage complaints in Hong Kong. The findings of the study are summarized in 
the following paragraphs. 
 In the recent decade, outsourcing has been widely adopted by both private and 
public organizations. It is believed that outsourcing is beneficial to the organizations 
for improving the products or services in terms of quantity or quality. Despite the 
merits of outsourcing, many scholars are criticizing on the performance and outcome 
of outsourcing practice. Some literature found that outsourcing actually leads to some 
potential risk of the organization such as cost increase, operation inflexibility and loss 
of core competence. With respect to outsourcing practice in public services, the 
arrangement has resulted in having negative impact to the public organizations 
(Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2001). 
 In Hong Kong, the Government is promoting outsourcing practice for 
government activates and services as a forms of private sector involvement. There is a 
growing trend for different departments to adopt outsourcing because of its potential 
benefits such as improving quality of services and cost reduction. However, the direct 
investigation report of Ombudsman revealed that, in the outsourcing arrangement of 
handling water seepage complaints, JO was ineffective in managing and monitoring 
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the consultants and low quality of service by the consultants was then resulted. In 
respect of the findings in literature review, it seems that outsourcing arrangement in 
JO has caused negative impacts to the operation. This leads to a deeper study of the 
outsourcing arrangement of handling of water seepage complaints in JO.  
 Water seepage in multi-story building is stated as a longstanding and complex 
problem for residents in Hong Kong. The public awareness to water seepage in 
buildings has greatly increased since the outbreak of severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) in Hong Kong in 2003. In order to give a health and safety 
environment in a building, dismissing the water seepage problems is one of the main 
issues for the residents. Besides, under the Public Health and Municipal Services 
Ordinance, the Building Ordinance and the Waterworks Ordinance, the Government 
has the responsibilities to intervene the seepage problems if the seepage causes public 
health nuisance, building safety risks or wastage of water. The Government, replying 
to the need of the community, gave a quick reaction to follow up the situation. In 2004, 
a pilot scheme of JO was jointly set up by Buildings Department (BD) and Food and 
Environmental Hygiene Department (FEHD) to give a trail for replacing the Tripartite 
Arrangement consisting of BD, FEHD and Water Supply Department (WSD) in 
handling of water seepage complaints for the public. The JO scheme was found as 
more efficient in handling seepage complaints than the past arrangement. In mid-2006, 
JO was extended to cover all 19 districts in the territory. The purpose of JO is to abate 
the public health nuisance by providing a one-stop service for handling of seepage 
complaints. 
 There are three stages in the investigation procedure of JO. Stage I is an initial 
screening process by FEHD staff of JO. Stages II and III are the further investigation 
done by FEHD and BD staff respectively to identify the source of seepage. At Stage 
III, outsourcing is adopted for acquiring professional in the market for investigating 
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the seepage complaints. This is the stage where Ombudsman blamed that JO was 
ineffective in managing and monitoring the consultants.  
 In order to investigate the impact in the outsourcing arrangement of JO, 
performance measurements, outsourcing outcomes and outsourcing relationships are 
the three main aspects of the study. Questionnaire surveys and interviews were 
conducted to collect opinions and information from the JO’s officers and the 
consultants. For JO, questionnaires were distributed to the Building Safety Officers 
(BSO) and there was one interview for a Head of Professional Officer and another 
interview for a Professional Officer (PO). For consultants, questionnaires were 
distributed to all current practitioner of the outsourced work and two interviews to 
consultant representatives were conducted.  
In conclusion to the findings on two sides, no serious negative impact was found 
in those three aspects. Performance measurements of JO can give consultants clear 
guidelines in handling the outsourced work. The bi-weekly meeting between PO and 
the consultant representatives contributes in giving a very good contact point for the 
two parties to communicate and have face to face interaction. Under this arrangement, 
both parties agreed that they can understand the difficulties encountered by the 
opposite party and have built up a cooperative sense in handling of water seepage 
complaints. However, JO claimed that report performances of the consultants do not 
always meet the requirements especially amendments of reports are frequently 
required. Consultants in reply said that their quality of work may not meet the 
standard at the beginning of the contract but their performances have been improving 
and already meet the standard now. This is also agreed by JO.  
In respect to outsourcing outcomes, both parties agreed that the anticipated 
benefits of JO have been achieved. Outsourcing of JO gives the operation more 
flexible in human resources management and more cost effectiveness. Consultants are 
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also claimed to be more flexible in working hours, financial resources, number of 
staff, office location and administration work which provide further motivations for 
JO in adopting outsourcing. However, the questionnaire survey found that BSOs was 
demotivated and there was a reduction in service quality by the outsourcing 
arrangement. PO explained that staff is demotivated by the uncontrollable factors 
rather than by the outsourcing arrangement. Also, both interviewees from JO and 
consultants revealed that those uncontrollable factors are the major obstacle in 
handling water seepage complaints efficiently to provide a high service quality.  
 Those uncontrollable factors are mainly related to communication and 
relationship problems with the complainants and undercomplainants (UC). Despite 
the result of both questionnaire and interviews showed that JO is keeping a 
satisfactory relationship with the consultants, it is difficult for JO staff or consultants 
to maintain a positive relationship with the complainants and UC. It is obvious that 
the seepage complaints have no need for JO’s intervention if the complainants and UC 
can solve the problem by themselves. The only reason for establishing a case under 
JO is that complainants and UC cannot negotiate for any solution. Most likely, UC 
would not show a sense of cooperation when the complainants find JO to intervene 
the seepage problems. This would commonly lead to access problem of the suspected 
premises of UC, rejection of testing at the suspected area or even adversary 
conversation to the inspection staff. On one hand that JO or consultants is facing the 
resistance from UC. On the other hand complainants try to speed up their case by 
asking the progress from JO or consultants frequently. However, complaints would 
not understand the difficulties encountered by JO or consultants. They always have a 
misunderstanding that JO is responsible for investigating the source of seepage but 
this is not the case. JO aims to abate the public health nuisance under the enforcement 
of the Public Health and Municipal Services Ordinance, Section 127. Interviewees of 
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both parties claimed that the human nature problems which they are facing are much 
more complicated than any technical issue on seepage investigation.  
 Although no serious impact was found in this study, the findings of the 
questionnaire and interviews raise an objection to the view of Ombudsman. No 
ineffective management of consultants by JO was observed. Instead, JO and 
consultants are cooperating and building partnerships in handling the seepage 
complaints in Hong Kong. However, why there are still complaints about the 
operation of JO and why low quality of service is show in some cases? 
 The study actually gives an insight to the question asked above. Other than those 
uncontrollable factors mentioned above affecting the performance of consultants or 
JO, the number of seepage complaints per month is actually unpredictable. In terms of 
human resources of JO, the existing number of staff cannot afford the continuous 
increase of seepage cases. Of course, outsourcing can give JO flexibility in 
distributing more cases to consultants. However, the outsourcing contract of each 
consultant is also capped by a fixed amount where the number of cases given to 
consultants is limited. This then go to the question of financial support of JO by the 
Government. However, JO is a department that only has expenditure and no income 
can be generated. JO is actually using the money from taxpayer to handle the seepage 
complaints. 
 In addition to the financial resources of JO, the study found that the 
understanding of public to the purpose and operation of JO is inadequate. Public 
concern over the water seepage in building should be firstly responsible by the owners 
themselves, but now have a situation that public is relying on JO in handling of 
seepage complaints. One of the interviewees from JO revealed that the situation is 
also the same for property management companies. They group the cases in the their 
buildings and sent all to JO to follow up. This situation is likely due to the service 
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provided by JO is free of charge to every complainant.  
 In respect to the findings of the study, the following recommendations are 
suggested for improving further operation of JO.  
1. Consistent in managing and monitoring consultants 
Although the outsourcing arrangement has given the anticipated benefits to JO, 
one of interviewees from consultants claimed that the performance measurement 
from different PO may be inconsistent in managing the consultants. This would 
lead to varied quality of service provided by different consultants. Therefore, 
consistent in managing and monitoring consultants by all PO is important to give 
an alignment on standard of service provided by all consultants. 
 
2. Encouraging better internal management of consultants 
The interview to JO’s staff did show that the internal management of some 
consultants is underperforming. JO should be active in encouraging improvement 
to those consultants. JO should also straightly control their performance through 
the bi-weekly meeting and the quarterly appraisal report. If their performance has 
no improvement upon reminder, warning letter or further action should be follow 
up for warning the consultants. 
 
3. Maintaining a good relationship with consultants 
The study finds that JO and consultants have a good outsourcing relationship 
within the period of the study. However, maintaining a good relationship for a 
long time should be much difficult than having for a while. The target for JO 
should be maintaining the relationship with consultants with a long period of time 
in order to give smoother operation of the outsourcing arrangement continually.  
.  
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4. Charging cost to complainants. 
Until now, handling seepage complaints is a service provided by JO free of charge. 
However, this causes the public relying on JO for the water seepage problems. I 
remember that for a few years ago, the use of the emergency service of public 
hospital was also free of charge but the public used the service even there was no 
emergency needs. After the establishment of charging HK$100 for each time of 
using the service, the public awareness to the use of emergency service of public 
hospital has been largely improved. As surveyors is also titled as ‘doctor of 
buildings’, the situation now faced by JO is very similar to the emergency service 
provided by public hospital. In addition, the service provided by JO continues 
using the taxpayer’s money while there is no limited quota of cases handled by JO 
per certain period. Lack of financial resources is directly affecting the quality of 
service provided by JO. Therefore, charging the complainants not only avoid some 
unnecessary complaints, but also provide JO financial support to continue 
operating the service.  
 
5. Civil education for water seepage investigation and self dispute resolution 
It is likely that the public is lack of knowledge in handling water seepage 
problems in buildings. Also, it seems that property management companies try not 
to handle it by putting the responsibilities to JO. Further policy on educating the 
public about the issue can lead them to self dispute resolution between owners in a 
building. Once the general knowledge of the public towards the issue has 
increased, a relief to the number of cases handled by JO would be properly 
resulted. 
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6. Improvement of construction design and workmanship 
Of course, prevention is always better than treatment. Improvement of 
construction design and workmanship in preventing water seepage in multi-story 
buildings can effectively give a stop to water seepage problems afterwards. It is 
essential for research and development of the construction industry to discover the 
latest and innovative technology for new buildings. This would be the most 
contributive in providing health and safety buildings for residents. 
 
 
7.2 Limitations of the Study 
 In this study, a questionnaire survey and interviews is used to acquire the 
opinions and views from staff of JO and consultants. In the questionnaire survey, the 
response rate of JO is 37.5% and the response rate of consultants is 21%. The 
response rate of JO was satisfactory while it is not for consultants. This may be due to 
no direct contact with the consultants for distributing the questionnaires. All 
questionnaires distributed to the consultants are assisted by the PO of JO. Besides, the 
disadvantage of using questionnaire survey is that respondents may give anticipated 
answers to the questions rather than providing their ‘true’ answers. Nevertheless, the 
information from the interviews also support the result of the questionnaire survey, so 
the result is still significant to the study.  
 Another limitation of this study is that there are no real seepage complaint case 
studies to support the final conclusion. All views and opinions are only collected from 
staff of JO and consultants only. As complaints or undercomplainants are also decisive 
parties of the performance of JO and consultants, adding their opinions in the study 
can give a holistic view over the issue. However, conducting seepage complaints case 
study requires 2-4 months for one case. It is impossible for the limited time in 
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preparing this dissertation. 
 
7.3 Areas for Further Research 
 In respect to the outsourcing arrangement of JO, although the current 
arrangement is found to be satisfactory by the views from JO and consultants, no 
opinion of complainants or undercomplainants is collected. This should be an area of 
further study to give a holistic view of the operation of JO.  
 Besides, one recommendation suggests charging some amount of money to 
complainants. This recommendation has not been supported by any research. So, it is 
possible to give a feasibility study of the issue especially in terms of legal aspect. 
 Although no serious impact was found in the outsourcing arrangement of JO, this 
does not mean that other Government departments perform the same in providing 
public service to the community. A research of all outsourcing practice in public 
sector of Hong Kong can investigate the current performance of outsourcing in the 
Government.  
 Other researches related to water seepage testing, prevention or construction 
technology for developing health and safety buildings in Hong Kong are also 
suggested. This can contribute to the long lasting water seepage problems in Hong 
Kong.  
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Request for conducting the study related to the outsourcing arrangement of 
investigation of water seepage complaints 
 
 
Dear Mr. Lam, 
 
I am Ng Kwok Kei, a BSc (Surveying) final year student of Department of Real 
Estate and Construction at the University of Hong Kong. I am conducting a research 
project on “The impact of outsourcing in public services: water seepage inspection in 
Hong Kong” and would like to invite the JO officers and consultants to participate. 
The study aims at investigating the performance measurement, outsourcing outcome 
and outsourcing relationship in the outsourcing arrangement noted by the Joint 
Offices and the consultants, which could have an impact on the quality of services of 
investigation of water seepage complaints provided under the Joint Office. This study 
involves  
1. Sending questionnaires to JO Officers and consultants 
2. Conducting interview with JO directors and contract managers of consultants 
 
In the study, views and opinions of the participants on the performance 
measurement, outsourcing outcome and outsourcing relationship in the outsourcing 
arrangement will be asked. I would request the approval from the JO to allow me to 
conduct the research on the subject. The questionnaire and the interview questions are 
attached for your reference. All data collected will be used solely for academic 
purpose and the identity of individuals will not be revealed without their consent and 
all data collected from you will be destroyed immediately after the examination of 
dissertation. The data collected for the study should be valuable to the Joint Office to 
propose improvement measures for further operations in the investigation work. If 
you have any questions about the research, please feel free to contact Ng Kwok Kei 
by phone 9288-6007 or by email ilovegod@hkusua.hku.hk.  
 
 Should you need further clarification, you may contact my supervisor, Dr. S.W. 
Poon, at 2859-2128. 
 
Thank you very much for your favorable consideration. I am looking forward to 
hearing from you soon. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
Ng Kwok Kei          
 __________________________ 
Endorsed by Dr. S.W. Poon    
 
 
 
P.S. Attachment with  
1. A set of questionnaire to JO officers and consultants.  
2. A set of questions would be asked during the interview. 
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Subject: Undergraduate Research project on Handling of Water Seepage Complaints 
 
Dear Mr. Wong, 
 
I am Ng Kwok Kei, a BSc (Surveying) final year student of Department of Real 
Estate and Construction at the University of Hong Kong. I am conducting a research 
project on “The impact of outsourcing in public services: water seepage inspection in 
Hong Kong” and would like to invite the JO officers and consultants to participate. 
 
Background of the Study 
In 2008, the direct investigation report from The Ombudsman and some 
newspaper articles stated some deficiencies of JO in handling water seepage 
complaints. Management of consultants is one of the areas that deficiencies were 
identified. With my interest to outsourcing in public services, I would like conduct a 
research over the outsourcing arrangement of the JO operation. 
 
Scope of the Study 
The study aims at investigating the performance measurement, outsourcing 
outcome and outsourcing relationship in the outsourcing arrangement noted by the 
Joint Offices and the consultants, which could have an impact on the quality of 
services of investigation of water seepage complaints provided under JO. This study 
involves  
1. Conducting questionnaires to BSO of JO and consultants 
2. Conducting interviews with one PO, one Head of JO and two contract 
managers of consultants/ consultants representatives 
 
Method of conducting Questionnaires 
For the questionnaire to BSO, soft copy will be sent to each BSO by email. Only 
5-10mins is required to complete the questionnaire. After filling in the questionnaire 
in the soft copy, they can simply reply my email attached with the completed 
questionnaire. Please fill in the questionnaire and sent it back to me within two weeks. 
For the questionnaire to consultants, all staff involved in handling water seepage 
complaints are the target of the questionnaire. They include the contract manager, 
technical staff and investigation assistants. Soft copy of the questionnaire will be sent 
to the contact person of each consultant. I would like to request each contact person to 
distribute the questionnaire to the target staff with soft copy or hard copy. Only 
5-10mins is required to complete the questionnaire. For the staff with soft copy, they 
can simply reply me in email attached with the completed questionnaire after filling in 
it. My email address is already attached in the questionnaire. For those with hard copy, 
I can collect it in person or consultants can scan the questionnaire and send it back to 
me by email. The time frame for consultants is also two weeks. 
 
Interview 
Individual interviews will be conducted with one PO, one Head of JO and two 
consultant representatives from JO1. I am mainly available in the afternoon starting 
from next week. I am flexible in arranging the venue for interview. It is possible for 
me to meet the interviewee in person. Each interview will last for 30mins to 1hr. 
 
 The following files are attached for your reference: 
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1. Research proposal 
2. Questionnaire to BSO  
3. Questionnaire to consultants 
4. Interview questions 
 
This study has already agreed by JO. To facilitate the arrangement of the 
questionnaires, please send me the email of BSO and consultants, or any other contact 
information of consultants. All data collected will be used solely for academic 
purpose and the identity of individuals will not be revealed without their consent and 
all data collected from you will be destroyed immediately after the examination of 
dissertation. The data collected for the study should be valuable to the JO to propose 
improvement measures for further operations in the investigation work. I would ask 
my supervisor if my department can give a copy of the research to FEHD. If you have 
any questions about the research, please feel free to contact Ng Kwok Kei by phone 
9288-6007 by email ilovegod@hkusua.hku.hk.  
 
Thank you very much for your favorable consideration and arrangement. 
 
Regards, 
Ng Kwok Kei 
 
 
 
 109 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix V 
 
Questionnaire to the Joint Office 
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Outsourcing Investigation of Water Seepage Complaints in Hong 
Kong 
 
This questionnaire will produce findings about the performance measurement, 
outsourcing outcome and outsourcing relationship in the outsourcing arrangement, 
which could have an impact on the quality of services of Investigation of Water 
Seepage Complaints (IWSC) provided under the Joint Office. It should benefit the 
Joint Office to propose improvement measures for further operations. 
 
 Please complete the following questions and email it to 
ilovegod@hkusua.hku.hk . If you wish to comment on any questions or qualify your 
answers, please use the space provided on the last page.  
 
 
A. Basic information 
A1.Location of your Joint Office  :  
 
A2.The district(s) of cases handled by you  
(e.g. Wan Chai, Kwun Tong): 
 
 
A3.What is the average range of cases handled by you per month? 
 
 ( e.g. 30-40) 
 
A4.What is the average range of cases handled by you were outsourced to consultants 
per month? 
 
  
 
A5. How many consultants were involved in your outsourced cases? 
 
  
 
B. Performance measurement of the IWSC work 
B1. How do you measure the outsourced work done by consultants? (can be more than 
one)  
Please put an “X” in the box.  
 A. own judgment    
 B. performance indicators given by JO    
 C. others: (please specify)  
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B2. Below is a list of statement about the performance measurement of the outsourced 
IWSC. 
For each of the following statements please rate your agreement or disagreement by 
making an “X” inside the box that best describes your opinion 
 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
1. Performance requirements:      
i) Performance requirements of IWSC 
were mutually agreed between JO and 
consultants. 
     
ii) Performance requirements for 
different JO officers towards 
consultants are consistent. 
     
iii) Performance requirements for JO 
towards different consultants are 
consistent. 
     
2. Operation performances:      
i) Consultants’ response to cases’ 
matters is efficient. 
     
ii) JO officers’ response to 
consultants’ request is efficient. 
     
iii) Consultants maintain a positive 
relationship with the complainants 
     
iv) JO officers maintain a positive 
relationship with the complainants 
     
v) Change of the personnel of 
consultants affects the operation 
performance. 
     
vi) Change of the personnel of JO 
officers affects the operation 
performance. 
     
vii) Consultants are performing their 
professionalism in IWSC 
     
3. Reports performances:      
i) There are too many report materials 
within one case of IWSC 
     
ii) Quality of report submitted by 
consultants is always acceptable 
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3. Reports performances: Strongly 
agree 
Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
iii) Requirement for amendments in a 
report by consultants is seldom. 
     
iv) Requirement for resubmission of a 
report by the consultants is seldom. 
     
v) Requirement for retest of IWSC by 
consultants is seldom. 
     
4. Other performances:      
i) Sanctions against the performance 
of consultants are adequate. 
     
ii) Others: 
 
     
iii) Others: 
 
     
 
 
C. Outsourcing Outcomes 
C1. Below is a list of possible outsourcing outcomes of the outsourced IWSC. 
 
For each of the following statements please rate the degree of agreement by making 
an “X” inside the box of the corresponding number that best describes your opinion. 
The smaller number represents the agreement to the outcome on the left and the larger 
number represents the agreement to the outcome on the right. 
 
Possible 
outcomes: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Possible 
outcomes: 
a) Cost reduction         Cost increase 
b) Improvement to 
service quality 
       Reduction to 
service quality 
c) Operational 
flexibility  
       Operational 
inflexibility  
d) Operational 
effectiveness 
       Operational 
ineffectiveness 
e) Effective use of 
JO officers 
       Ineffective use of 
JO officers 
f) Motivated staff        Demotivated staff 
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D. Outsourcing Relationship(s) 
D1. Below is a list of statement about outsourcing relationship between JO officers 
and consultants in the outsourced IWSC. 
 
For each of the following statements please rate your agreement or disagreement by 
making an “X” inside the box that best describes your opinion 
 
 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
1. JO and consultants shared the same 
objective in IWSC 
     
2. The responsibility between JO 
officers and consultants are clear.  
     
Others:      
Others:      
 
D2. Below is a list of possible quality of outsourcing relationship(s) of the outsourced 
IWSC. 
For each of the following statements please rate the degree of agreement by making 
an “X” inside the box of the corresponding number that best describes your opinion. 
The smaller number represents the agreement to the quality of relationship on the left 
and the larger number represents the agreement to the quality of relationship on the 
right. 
 
Quality: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Quality: 
a) Co-operative        Adversarial 
b) Open / 
Transparent  
       Closed / on a 
need-to-know 
basis 
c) Partnership 
building 
       Strictly 
contractual 
d) Improving        Declining 
E) Flexible to 
emerging needs  
       Inflexible to 
emerging needs 
f) Respectful        Disrespectful 
g) Involved        Distant 
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E. Other information 
 
E1. The following information will not be used in any part of the published study 
results but is simply intended to provide appropriate up-to-date contact 
information. 
 
E2. Contact Person:  
 Contact Number:  
 Fax Number:  
 E-mail address:  
 
E3. Would you like a copy of the published results when they become available?  
 No 
 Yes 
 
E4. If you have any comments and recommendations you would like make about this 
survey, or the outsourcing arrangement of IWSC, please write them in the box 
below. 
 
 
Your contribution to this survey is very greatly appreciated. 
 
Please e-mail the questionnaire to ilovegod@hkusua.hku.hk . 
A copy of the results of this survey will be sent to all participants upon request. 
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Performance measurements 
- Performance requirements 
???????????
?????????
??????
?????? ?????????? ?????????
?????????
?????????
??????
??????
?????
??????
?????
?????
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ???? ???? ???? ???? ??? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ???? ???? ???? ???? ??? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ???? ???? ???? ???? ??? ? ? ? ? ? ?
 
Statements 
4. Performance requirements of Investigation of Water Seepage Complaints (IWSC) were 
mutually agreed between JO and consultants. 
5. Performance requirements for different JO officers towards consultants are consistent. 
6. Performance requirements for JO towards different consultants are consistent. 
 
- Operation performances 
???????????
?????????
??????
?????? ?????????? ?????????
?????????
?????????
??????
??????
?????
??????
?????
?????
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ???? ???? ???? ???? ??? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ???? ???? ???? ??? ??? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ??? ???? ???? ???? ???? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ??? ???? ???? ???? ??? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ???? ???? ???? ??? ??? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ???? ???? ???? ???? ??? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?? ?? ??? ?? ?? ?? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ??? ???? ???? ???? ??? ? ? ? ? ? ?
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Statements 
8. Consultants’ response to cases’ matters is efficient. 
9. JO officers’ response to consultants’ request is efficient. 
10. Consultants maintain a positive relationship with the complainants 
11. JO officers maintain a positive relationship with the complainants 
12. Change of the personnel of consultants affects the operation performance. 
13. Change of the personnel of JO officers affects the operation performance. 
14. Consultants are performing their professionalism in IWSC. 
 
- Report performances 
???????????
?????????
??????
?????? ?????????? ?????????
?????????
?????????
??????
??????
?????
??????
?????
?????
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ??? ???? ???? ???? ???? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ??? ??? ???? ???? ???? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ??? ??? ??? ???? ???? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ??? ??? ???? ???? ???? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ???? ???? ???? ??? ??? ? ? ? ? ? ?
 
Statements 
6. There are too many report materials within one case of IWSC 
7. Quality of report submitted by consultants is always acceptable  
8. Requirement for amendments in a report by consultants is seldom. 
9. Requirement for resubmission of a report by the consultants is seldom.  
10. Requirement for retest of IWSC by consultants is seldom. 
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- Other performances measurements 
???????????
?????????
??????
?????? ?????????? ?????????
?????????
?????????
??????
??????
?????
??????
?????
?????
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ??? ???? ???? ???? ??? ? ? ? ? ? ?
 
Statements 
2. Sanctions against the performance of consultants are adequate. 
 
Outsourcing outcomes 
??????????????????
?????????
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ?
?????
??????
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ? ????? ?
? ? ???? ???? ???? ??? ??? ??? ??? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ? ????? ?
? ? ??? ??? ???? ???? ???? ???? ??? ? ?
?? ?? ??? ?? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ? ????? ?
? ? ???? ???? ???? ??? ??? ??? ??? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ? ????? ?
? ? ??? ???? ???? ???? ??? ??? ??? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ? ????? ?
? ? ??? ???? ???? ???? ???? ??? ??? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ? ????? ?
? ? ??? ??? ???? ???? ???? ???? ??? ? ?
 
Possible pair of outcomes 1-7  
a) Cost reduction <> Cost increase 
b) Improvement to service quality <> Reduction to service quality 
c) Operational flexibility <> Operational inflexibility 
d) Operational effectiveness <> Operational ineffectiveness 
e) Effective use of JO officers <> Ineffective use of JO officers 
f) Motivated staff <> Demotivated staff 
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Outsourcing relationships 
???????????
?????????
??????
?????? ?????????? ?????????
?????????
?????????
??????
??????
?????
??????
?????
?????
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ??? ??? ???? ???? ???? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ???? ???? ???? ??? ??? ? ? ? ? ? ?
 
Statements 
3. JO and consultants shared the same objective in IWSC. 
4. The responsibility between JO officers and consultants are clear. 
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??????????????????
?????????
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ?
?????
??????
?? ?? ??? ?? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ? ????? ?
? ? ??? ???? ???? ???? ???? ??? ??? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ? ????? ?
? ? ???? ???? ???? ??? ??? ??? ??? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ? ????? ?
? ? ???? ???? ???? ???? ??? ??? ??? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ? ????? ?
? ? ??? ???? ???? ???? ???? ??? ??? ? ?
?? ?? ??? ?? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ? ????? ?
? ? ???? ???? ???? ???? ??? ??? ??? ? ?
?? ?? ??? ?? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ? ????? ?
? ? ???? ???? ???? ??? ??? ??? ??? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ? ????? ?
? ? ???? ???? ???? ??? ??? ??? ??? ? ?
 
Possible pair of relationships 1-7  
a) Co-operative <> Adversarial 
b) Open / Transparent  <> Closed / on a need-to-know basis 
c) Partnership building <> Strictly contractual 
d) Improving <> Declining 
e) Flexible to emerging needs  <> Inflexible to emerging needs 
f) Respectful <> Disrespectful 
g) Involved <> Distant 
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I. Why outsourcing? 
1. Why the investigation work is outsourced? 
2. What is the expectation of JO for outsourcing? 
 
II. Performance measurement: 
1. What is the mechanism of measuring the performance of the consultants? 
2. Any KPI for the outsourced work? 
3. Is the mechanism consistence form different JO offices? 
4. Are there too many report materials for the investigation work? Why? 
5. Is the requirement to consultants for amendments or resubmission of reports 
frequent? 
6. Will the further amendments or resubmission of work cause an additional workload to 
the staffs? 
7. Do the contractors always meet the requirements of the work? If not, why? 
8. What will be the consequence if the consultants do not meet the performance 
requirement? 
9. Do the contractors efficient in handling the investigation? If nor, why? 
10. What are your views about the quality of service done by the consultants? 
11. What is the relationship between the staff and complainants? 
12. Are there any ways to get feedback from the complainants (users of the service)? 
 
III. Outsourcing outcome: 
1. Are the anticipated benefits achieved? 
 
IV. Outsourcing relationship: 
1. How do you describe the existing relationship between JO and consultants? 
2. Any adversarial relationship report from staff? 
3. Do the consultants share the same objective as you in handling the investigation? 
Why? 
4. Are the requirements between you and consultants are mutually agreed? Why? 
5. Are there any unclear responsibilities between you and the consultants? If yes, why? 
 
V. Others: 
1. How would JO seek for continuous improvement of the work? What need improve? 
2. Would you observed any negative impact from staffs? 
3. Do you find the outsourcing work lead to inflexibility in responding to the need of 
communities? 
4. Does the outsourcing service cost more than conducted by in-house? 
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Outsourcing Investigation of Water Seepage Complaints in Hong 
Kong 
 
This questionnaire will produce findings about the performance measurement, 
outsourcing outcome and outsourcing relationship in the outsourcing arrangement, 
which could have an impact on the quality of services of Investigation of Water 
Seepage Complaints (IWSC) provided under the Joint Office. 
 
 Please complete the following questions and email it to 
ilovegod@hkusua.hku.hk . If you wish to comment on any questions or qualify your 
answers, please use the space provided on the last page.  
 
 
 
B. Basic information 
A1. Name of consultants’ firm  :  
 
 
A2.What is the average range of cases handled by you per month? 
 
 ( e.g. 30-40) 
 
A3. How many districts involved within the cases handled by you? 
 
  
 
 
C. Performance measurement of the IWSC work 
 
B1. Below is a list of statement about the performance measurement of the outsourced 
IWSC. 
For each of the following statements please rate your agreement or disagreement by 
making an “X” inside the box that best describes your opinion 
 
 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
1. Performance requirements:      
i) Performance requirements of IWSC 
were mutually agreed between 
consultants and JO. 
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1. Performance requirements: Strongly 
agree 
Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
ii) Performance requirements for 
different JO officers towards 
consultants are consistent. 
     
2. Operation performances:      
i) Consultant’s response to cases’ 
matters is efficient. 
     
ii) JO officers’ response to 
consultants’ request is efficient. 
     
iii) Consultant maintains a positive 
relationship with the complainants 
     
iv) JO officers maintain a positive 
relationship with the complainants 
     
v) Change of the personnel of 
consultants affects the operation 
performance. 
     
vi) Change of the personnel of JO 
officers affects the operation 
performance. 
     
vii) Consultants are performing their 
professionalism in IWSC 
     
3. Reports performances:      
i) There are too many report materials 
within one case of IWSC 
     
ii) Quality of report submitted by 
consultants is always acceptable 
     
iii) Requirement for amendments in a 
report by consultants is seldom. 
     
iv) Requirement for resubmission of a 
report by the consultants is seldom. 
     
v) Requirement for retest of IWSC by 
consultants is seldom. 
     
4. Other performances:      
i) Sanctions against the performance 
of consultants are adequate. 
     
ii) Others: 
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iii) Others: 
 
     
 
D. Outsourcing Outcomes 
C1. Below is a list of possible outsourcing outcomes of the outsourced IWSC. 
 
For each of the following statements please rate the degree of agreement by making 
an “X” inside the box of the corresponding number that best describes your opinion. 
The smaller number represents the agreement to the outcome on the left and the larger 
number represents the agreement to the outcome on the right. 
 
Possible 
outcomes: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Possible 
outcomes: 
a) Improvement to 
service quality 
       Reduction to 
service quality 
b) Operational 
flexibility  
       Operational 
inflexibility  
c) Operational 
effectiveness 
       Operational 
ineffectiveness 
 
 
 
E. Outsourcing Relationship(s) 
D1. Below is a list of statement about outsourcing relationship in the outsourced 
IWSC. 
 
For each of the following statements please rate your agreement or disagreement by 
making an “X” inside the box that best describes your opinion 
 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
1. JO and consultants shared the same 
objective in IWSC 
     
2. The responsibility between JO 
officers and consultants are clear.  
     
Others:      
Others:      
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D2. Below is a list of possible quality of outsourcing relationship(s) between JO 
officers and consultants of the outsourced IWSC. 
 
For each of the following statements please rate the degree of agreement by making 
an “X” inside the box of the corresponding number that best describes your opinion. 
The smaller number represents the agreement to the quality of relationship on the left 
and the larger number represents the agreement to the quality of relationship on the 
right. 
 
Quality: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Quality: 
a) Co-operative        Adversarial 
b) Partnership 
building 
       Strictly 
contractual 
c) Improving        Declining 
d) Flexible to 
emerging needs  
       Inflexible to 
emerging needs 
e) Respectful        Disrespectful 
f) Involved        Distant 
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F. Other information 
 
E1. The following information will not be used in any part of the published study 
results but is simply intended to provide appropriate up-to-date contact 
information. 
 
E2. Contact Person:  
 Contact Number:  
 Fax Number:  
 E-mail address:  
 
E3. Would you like a copy of the published results when they become available? 
 No 
 Yes 
 
E4. If you have any comments and recommendations you would like make about this 
survey, or the outsourcing arrangement of IWSC, please write them in the box 
below. 
 
 
Your contribution to this survey is very greatly appreciated. 
 
Please e-mail the questionnaire to ilovegod@hkusua.hku.hk . 
A copy of the results of this survey will be sent to all participants upon request. 
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Performance measurements 
- Performance requirements 
???????????
?????????
??????
?????? ?????????? ?????????
?????????
?????????
??????
??????
?????
??????
?????
?????
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ???? ???? ???? ???? ??? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ???? ???? ???? ???? ??? ? ? ? ? ? ?
 
Statements 
1. Performance requirements of IWSC were mutually agreed between consultants and JO. 
2. Performance requirements for different JO officers towards consultants are consistent. 
 
 
- Operation performances 
???????????
?????????
??????
?????? ?????????? ?????????
?????????
?????????
??????
??????
?????
??????
?????
?????
?? ?? ??? ?? ?? ?? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ???? ???? ??? ??? ??? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ???? ???? ???? ???? ??? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ??? ???? ???? ???? ???? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ??? ?? ?? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ??? ???? ???? ??? ??? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ?? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ??? ???? ???? ???? ???? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ?? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ??? ???? ???? ???? ??? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?? ??? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ???? ???? ???? ??? ??? ? ? ? ? ? ?
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Statements 
1. Consultant’s response to cases’ matters is efficient. 
2. JO officers’ response to consultants’ request is efficient. 
3. Consultant maintains a positive relationship with the complainants 
4. JO officers maintain a positive relationship with the complainants 
5. Change of the personnel of consultants affects the operation performance. 
6. Change of the personnel of JO officers affects the operation performance. 
7. Consultants are performing their professionalism in IWSC. 
 
- Report performances 
???????????
?????????
??????
?????? ?????????? ?????????
?????????
?????????
??????
??????
?????
??????
?????
?????
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ??? ???? ???? ???? ??? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ??? ?? ?? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ??? ???? ???? ???? ??? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ?? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ??? ???? ???? ???? ???? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?? ?? ??? ?? ?? ?? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ???? ???? ???? ???? ??? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?? ?? ??? ?? ?? ?? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ???? ???? ???? ??? ??? ? ? ? ? ? ?
 
Statements 
1. There are too many report materials within one case of IWSC. 
2. Quality of report submitted by consultants is always acceptable. 
3. Requirement for amendments in a report by consultants is seldom. 
4. Requirement for resubmission of a report by the consultants is seldom.  
5. Requirement for retest of IWSC by consultants is seldom. 
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- Other performances measurements 
???????????
?????????
??????
?????? ?????????? ?????????
?????????
?????????
??????
??????
?????
??????
?????
?????
?? ?? ??? ?? ?? ?? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ???? ???? ???? ??? ??? ? ? ? ? ? ?
 
Statements 
3. Sanctions against the performance of consultants are adequate. 
 
 
 
 
Outsourcing outcomes 
??????????????????
?????????
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ?
?????
??????
?? ?? ?? ??? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ? ????? ?
? ? ??? ???? ???? ???? ??? ??? ??? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ?? ?? ? ?? ? ????? ?
? ? ??? ???? ???? ???? ??? ??? ??? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ? ????? ?
? ? ??? ???? ???? ???? ??? ??? ??? ? ?
 
Possible pair of outcomes 1-7  
a) Improvement to service quality <> Reduction to service quality 
b) Operational flexibility <> Operational inflexibility 
c) Operational effectiveness <> Operational ineffectiveness 
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Outsourcing relationships 
???????????
?????????
??????
?????? ?????????? ?????????
?????????
?????????
??????
??????
?????
??????
?????
?????
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ???? ???? ???? ???? ??? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ? ????? ? ????? ?
? ? ???? ???? ???? ??? ??? ? ? ? ? ? ?
 
Statements 
5. JO and consultants shared the same objective in IWSC. 
6. The responsibility between JO officers and consultants are clear. 
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??????????????????
?????????
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ?
?????
??????
?? ?? ?? ??? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ? ????? ?
? ? ??? ???? ???? ???? ???? ??? ??? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ??? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ? ????? ?
? ? ??? ???? ???? ???? ??? ??? ??? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ? ????? ?
? ? ??? ???? ???? ???? ??? ??? ??? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ? ????? ?
? ? ??? ???? ???? ???? ??? ??? ??? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ? ????? ?
? ? ???? ???? ???? ???? ??? ??? ??? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ? ????? ?
? ? ???? ???? ???? ???? ??? ??? ??? ? ?
 
 
Possible pair of relationships 1-7  
a) Co-operative <> Adversarial 
b) Partnership building <> Strictly contractual 
c) Improving <> Declining 
d) Flexible to emerging needs  <> Inflexible to emerging needs 
e) Respectful <> Disrespectful 
f) Involved <> Distant 
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Performance measurement: 
1. Do you get clear requirements for the investigation from JO? 
2. Are the requirements consistence form different JO officers? 
3. Are there too many report materials for the investigation work? Why? 
4. Is the requirement to consultants for amendments or resubmission of reports frequent? 
Why? 
5. Will the further amendments or resubmission of work cause an additional workload to 
the staffs? 
6. Do your staffs always meet the requirements of the work? If not, why? 
7. What will be the consequence if the consultants do not meet the performance 
requirement? 
8. Do the contractors efficient in handling the investigation? If nor, why? 
9. What are your views about the quality of service done by the consultants? 
10. What is the relationship between the staff and complainants? 
11. What difficulties are you facing in handling the work? 
12. Have your company received any warning letters? 
 
Outsourcing outcome: 
1. Do you think the anticipated benefits of outsourcing achieved by JO? 
 
Outsourcing relationship: 
1. How do you describe the existing relationship between JO and consultants? 
2. Any adversarial relationship reported from your staff? 
3. Do you share the same objective as JO in handling the investigation? Why? 
4. Are the requirements between you and consultants are mutually agreed? Why? 
5. Are there any unclear responsibilities between you and the consultants? If yes, why? 
 
Others: 
1. Is there a comprehensive record management for the investigation work? Why? 
2. Would you observed any negative impact from staffs? 
3. Do you find the outsourcing work lead to inflexibility in responding to the need of 
communities? 
4. Are there any subcontractors for handling the outsourced work? 
5. What is your opinion on the duration of the contract? 
6. Are you motivated to continue to tender for the investigation work? 
7. Any improvements are required for the outsourcing arrangement of JO? 
8. Any improvements are required for handling of water seepage complaints by JO? 
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Translation 
Notes to Owners/Occupiers 
General Procedures for Investigating Water Seepage Problems  
by the Joint Office of the Buildings Department and 
 the Food and Environmental Hygiene Department 
 
Responsibilities of Owners and Occupiers 
Water seepage is usually caused by defective building fabric or installations and their lack of 
proper maintenance.  As it is the responsibility of owners and occupiers to maintain their 
buildings and to ensure environmental hygiene, their co-operation in resolving water seepage 
problems is essential.   
 
Objective of the Joint Office 
The objective of the Joint Office (JO) is to identify the source of seepage by means of 
systematic investigation, through the legal authority and the professional expertise of the 
relevant government departments as well as the co-operation of the owners/occupiers, and to 
require the owners concerned to carry out repair in order to resolve the water seepage 
problem. 
Reinstatement works of the affected premises or area will not be undertaken by JO. 
 
General Procedures 
JO staff will contact the complainant within 6 working days upon receipt of a complaint to 
arrange an inspection to the affected premises.  The complainant should assist in arranging 
access to the affected premises or area as far as possible, and also remove anything (e.g. false 
ceiling) that tends to conceal the seepage location in order to facilitate investigation. 
If the water seepage nuisance is identified, JO staff will carry out investigation and tests at 
the premises suspected to have caused the seepage by virtue of the authority vested in them 
under the Public Health and Municipal Services Ordinance (Cap.132).  In the case that 
access to the premises for investigation is denied, JO will apply for a “Warrant to Effect 
Entry into Premises” from the Court in order to proceed with investigation and tests. 
The Joint Office will carry out non-destructive tests systematically so as to identify the 
seepage source.  With the co-operation of the concerned owners/occupiers, normally the 
Joint Office will complete the investigation and inform the complainant of the outcome 
within 90 working days.  If the investigation cannot be completed within 90 working days, 
the Joint Office will notify the complainant of the investigation progress in writing.  If the 
seepage is mild, or significant improvements have been found, or the source of seepage 
cannot be identified after such tests, the investigation work of JO will cease.  
 
Investigating Water Seepage Problems 
In general, water seepage investigation will be conducted in 3 stages by the Environmental 
Nuisance Investigators, Building Safety Officers or the staff of the private consultants 
appointed by JO respectively.   
 
Stage I – Confirmation of Water Seepage Nuisance (by Environmental Nuisance 
Investigators) 
JO staff will visit the complainant’s premises to record the condition of the seepage location 
and other relevant information.  If the moisture content of the seepage area is found to 
exceed 35% and premises of other owner are suspected to have caused the seepage problem, 
Stage II – “Initial Investigation” will be carried out. 
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Stage II – Initial Investigation (normally by Environmental Nuisance Investigators) 
One or more of the following tests will be conducted by JO staff depending on the 
circumstances of each case: 
Test method est location Premises involved Time required#1 
Colour Water Test Drainage outlets Suspected premises About 1 hour 
Reversible Pressure Test #2 Water supply pipes and 
eepage area 
Suspected premises and 
omplainant’s premises About 3 to 5 hours 
Moisture Content Monitoringall surface/ ceiling Complainant’s premises About 0.5 hour each time
#1 Time required for each test may vary according to the site condition. 
#2 Reversible pressure test will be carried out only if leakage from water supply pipes is suspected 
and continuous water dripping is detected in the seepage area. 
Normally, JO staff will visit the suspected premises once or twice for investigation and tests.  
In complicated cases (e.g. those involving more than one bathroom or several seepage 
locations), multiple visits for investigation and tests will be required.  In some special cases, 
additional visits to the complainant’s premises may be required for confirming the test results 
or monitoring any changes in the seepage condition.  If a case is so complicated that the 
source of seepage cannot be identified immediately after “Initial Investigation”, JO will 
proceed to Stage III – “Professional Investigation”. 
 
Stage III – Professional Investigation (by Building Safety Officers or the staff of the 
private consultants appointed by JO) 
JO staff or staff of the consultants appointed will carry out one or more of the following tests: 
Test method#3 est location Premises involved Time required#4 
Ponding Test Floor slabs of balcony/ 
athroom/kitchen spected premises About 2 hours 
Reversible Pressure Test 
(if not carried out in Stage II) 
Water supply pipes and
eepage area 
Suspected premises and 
omplainant’s premises About 3 to 5 hours 
Moisture Content Monitoring  all surface/ceiling Complainant’s premises About 0.5 hour each time 
#3 Based on the test results, JO staff or the consultants appointed will make assessment to 4 possible 
seepage sources (leakage of drainage pipes, leaking water supply pipes, defective floor slabs and 
rainwater penetration). When necessary, JO will conduct tests again at any suspected sources of 
seepage. 
#4 Time required for each test may vary according to the site condition. 
Normally, JO staff will visit the suspected premises once or twice for investigation and tests.  
In complicated cases (e.g. those involving more than one bathroom or several seepage 
locations), multiple visits for investigation and tests will be required.  In some special cases, 
additional visits to the complainant’s premises may be required for confirming the test results 
or monitoring any changes in the seepage condition. 
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